I’ll just note, like I did before on the Prometheus problem, that a decision agent can demonstrate a preference for having existed (by creating Bob, say) while also demonstrating a preference for ceasing to exist; I don’t think this makes the agent vulnerable to being Dutch-booked. Likewise, a decision agent can demonstrate a preference for not having existed while also demonstrating a preference for continuing to exist. It’s not clear to me whether humans have a preference for having existed, because we so rarely get a chance to choose whether to have existed.
I’ll just note, like I did before on the Prometheus problem, that a decision agent can demonstrate a preference for having existed (by creating Bob, say) while also demonstrating a preference for ceasing to exist; I don’t think this makes the agent vulnerable to being Dutch-booked. Likewise, a decision agent can demonstrate a preference for not having existed while also demonstrating a preference for continuing to exist. It’s not clear to me whether humans have a preference for having existed, because we so rarely get a chance to choose whether to have existed.