We need a sense in which Bob is “just as likely to have existed” as I am, otherwise, it isn’t a fair trade.
First considering the case before Omega’s machine is introduced. The information necessary to create Bob contains the information necessary to create me, since Bob is specified as a person who would specifically create me, and not anyone else who might also make him. Add to that all the additional information necessary to specify Bob as a person, and surely Bob is much less likely to have existed than I am, if this phrase can be given any meaning. This saves us from being obligated to tile the universe with hypothetical people who would have created us.
With Omega’s machine, we also imagine Bob as having run across such a machine, so he doesn’t have to contain the same information anymore. Still Bob has the specific characteristic of having a somewhat unusual response to the “Bob the jerk” problem, which might make him less likely to have existed. So this case is less clear, but it still doesn’t seem like a fair trade.
To give a specific sense for “just as likely to have existed,” imagine Prometheus drew up two complete plans for people to create, one for Bob and one for you, then flipped a coin to decide which one to create, which turned out to be you. Now that you exists, Prometheus lets you choose whether to also create Bob. Again lets say Bob would have created you, if and only if he thought you would create him. In this case we can eliminate Bob, since it’s really the same if Prometheus just says “I flipped heads and just created you. But if I flipped tails, I would have created you if and only if I thought you would give me 100 bucks. So give me 100 bucks.” (The only difference is in the case with Bob, Prometheus creates you indirectly by creating Bob who then chooses to create you). The only difference between this and Pascal’s mugging is that your reward in the counterfactual case is existence. I can’t think of any reason (other than a sense of obligation) to choose differently in this problem than you do in Pascal’s mugging.
Finally, imagine the same situation with Prometheus, but let’s say Bob isn’t a real jerk, just really annoying and smells bad. He also finds you annoying and malodorous. You are worse off if he exists. But Prometheus tells you Bob would have created you if Prometheus had flipped tails. Do you create Bob? It’s sort of a counterfactual prisoner’s dilemma.
We need a sense in which Bob is “just as likely to have existed” as I am, otherwise, it isn’t a fair trade.
First considering the case before Omega’s machine is introduced. The information necessary to create Bob contains the information necessary to create me, since Bob is specified as a person who would specifically create me, and not anyone else who might also make him. Add to that all the additional information necessary to specify Bob as a person, and surely Bob is much less likely to have existed than I am, if this phrase can be given any meaning. This saves us from being obligated to tile the universe with hypothetical people who would have created us.
With Omega’s machine, we also imagine Bob as having run across such a machine, so he doesn’t have to contain the same information anymore. Still Bob has the specific characteristic of having a somewhat unusual response to the “Bob the jerk” problem, which might make him less likely to have existed. So this case is less clear, but it still doesn’t seem like a fair trade.
To give a specific sense for “just as likely to have existed,” imagine Prometheus drew up two complete plans for people to create, one for Bob and one for you, then flipped a coin to decide which one to create, which turned out to be you. Now that you exists, Prometheus lets you choose whether to also create Bob. Again lets say Bob would have created you, if and only if he thought you would create him. In this case we can eliminate Bob, since it’s really the same if Prometheus just says “I flipped heads and just created you. But if I flipped tails, I would have created you if and only if I thought you would give me 100 bucks. So give me 100 bucks.” (The only difference is in the case with Bob, Prometheus creates you indirectly by creating Bob who then chooses to create you). The only difference between this and Pascal’s mugging is that your reward in the counterfactual case is existence. I can’t think of any reason (other than a sense of obligation) to choose differently in this problem than you do in Pascal’s mugging.
Finally, imagine the same situation with Prometheus, but let’s say Bob isn’t a real jerk, just really annoying and smells bad. He also finds you annoying and malodorous. You are worse off if he exists. But Prometheus tells you Bob would have created you if Prometheus had flipped tails. Do you create Bob? It’s sort of a counterfactual prisoner’s dilemma.