Re: by fiat… yes, that’s true. In behavior-modification as in many other things, the thing I can do most easily is not the thing that gets me the best results. This is, of course, not an argument in favor of doing the easiest thing.
Re: TDT… I don’t see where TDT makes different requirements from common sense, here.
Re: using p/EB at the time of the crime… of course. If I want to affect your decision-making process now, the only thing that matters is the policy I have now and how credibly I articulate/ that policy. But that’s just as true of my policy around how I investigate crimes (which affects p) as it is of my policy around how I select punishments (which affects SP).
Relatedly: yes, most of my suggestions require lead time; if you’re in a “ticking time bomb” scenario your options are more limited. That said, I distrust such claims: it’s far more common for people to pretend to exigent circumstances than it is for such circumstances to actually occur.
My point is simply that you shouldn’t reduce the punishment after the fact, by say rescuing Bellatrix, simply because you have since changed the value of p and/or EB.
On the account you’ve given so far, I don’t see why not.
If I’ve followed you correctly, your position is that severe punishment of prisoners is justified because it deters crime in the future.
But if I implement a 100% effective crime-deterrent—say, I release a nanovirus into the atmosphere that rewires everyone’s brains to obey the law at all times—then from that moment forward severe punishment no longer deters crime. That is, I will get the same crime rate in the future whether I punish my current prisoners or not.
So why should I continue punishing them in that case? It seems like wasted effort.
Granted, none of the suggestions I’ve proposed are 100% effective. But it seems like the same argument scales down.
You’re claiming that in order to deter crime today, I should establish an SP inversely correlated with p (among other things). If I raise p today, then, it follows that I should lower SP today to keep deterrence constant. What benefit is there to continuing to punish existing prisoners under the old SP?
If I assume that changes to SP are retroactive but that changes to p and EB aren’t… for example, if I assume that if today I increase my ability to catch criminals (say, by implementing superior DNA scanning), this only affects criminals who commit crimes today or later, not criminals who committed a crime last year… then I agree with you.
If that’s not true, then I don’t agree. The same logic that says “Dave will probably lower SP in the future, so I should apply a discount factor to his claimed SP” also says “Dave will probably raise p in the future, so I should apply an inflation factor to his claimed p.” And since what’s driving the reduction in SP in this toy example is precisely the increase in P, the factors should offset one another, which keeps my level of deterrence constant.
Now, I grant you, this assumes a rather high degree of rationality from my hypothetical criminal. In the real world, I strongly doubt any actual criminals would reason quantitatively this way. But in the real world, I strongly doubt any actual criminals reason quantitatively from EB, SP, and p in the first place.
If I assume that changes to SP are retroactive but that changes to p and EB aren’t… for example, if I assume that if today I increase my ability to catch criminals (say, by implementing superior DNA scanning), this only affects criminals who commit crimes today or later, not criminals who committed a crime last year… then I agree with you.
Well, retroactive changes to p tend to be much smaller since most evidence degrades with time.
Also in this case since the crime is attempting violent overthrow of the government retroactive changes in p are almost non-existent, after all a successful overthrow by its nature virtually eliminates your chances of getting punished for it.
Well, retroactive changes to p tend to be much smaller since most evidence degrades with time.
That’s a fair point. So, yes: if p is effectively constant and SP is not, you’re right that that’s a good reason to keep applying the old SP to old prisoners. I stand corrected.
Also in this case since the crime is attempting violent overthrow of the government retroactive changes in p are almost non-existent, after all a successful overthrow by its nature virtually eliminates your chances of getting punished for it.
So are you saying the SP-setting strategy you’re proposing doesn’t apply to crimes that don’t destabilize the criminal justice system itself?
So are you saying the SP-setting strategy you’re proposing doesn’t apply to crimes that don’t destabilize the criminal justice system itself?
I’m saying what I said and hopefully what’s true, redo the calculations yourself if you like. Here I’m saying that if a crime has the potential to destabilize the criminal justice system itself, that should be taken into account when calculating p.
Re: by fiat… yes, that’s true. In behavior-modification as in many other things, the thing I can do most easily is not the thing that gets me the best results. This is, of course, not an argument in favor of doing the easiest thing.
Re: TDT… I don’t see where TDT makes different requirements from common sense, here.
Re: using p/EB at the time of the crime… of course. If I want to affect your decision-making process now, the only thing that matters is the policy I have now and how credibly I articulate/ that policy. But that’s just as true of my policy around how I investigate crimes (which affects p) as it is of my policy around how I select punishments (which affects SP).
Relatedly: yes, most of my suggestions require lead time; if you’re in a “ticking time bomb” scenario your options are more limited. That said, I distrust such claims: it’s far more common for people to pretend to exigent circumstances than it is for such circumstances to actually occur.
My point is simply that you shouldn’t reduce the punishment after the fact, by say rescuing Bellatrix, simply because you have since changed the value of p and/or EB.
On the account you’ve given so far, I don’t see why not.
If I’ve followed you correctly, your position is that severe punishment of prisoners is justified because it deters crime in the future.
But if I implement a 100% effective crime-deterrent—say, I release a nanovirus into the atmosphere that rewires everyone’s brains to obey the law at all times—then from that moment forward severe punishment no longer deters crime. That is, I will get the same crime rate in the future whether I punish my current prisoners or not.
So why should I continue punishing them in that case? It seems like wasted effort.
Granted, none of the suggestions I’ve proposed are 100% effective. But it seems like the same argument scales down.
You’re claiming that in order to deter crime today, I should establish an SP inversely correlated with p (among other things). If I raise p today, then, it follows that I should lower SP today to keep deterrence constant. What benefit is there to continuing to punish existing prisoners under the old SP?
Otherwise your new value of SP isn’t credible. After all, you’re likely to lower it again in the future and then apply the change retroactively.
If I assume that changes to SP are retroactive but that changes to p and EB aren’t… for example, if I assume that if today I increase my ability to catch criminals (say, by implementing superior DNA scanning), this only affects criminals who commit crimes today or later, not criminals who committed a crime last year… then I agree with you.
If that’s not true, then I don’t agree. The same logic that says “Dave will probably lower SP in the future, so I should apply a discount factor to his claimed SP” also says “Dave will probably raise p in the future, so I should apply an inflation factor to his claimed p.” And since what’s driving the reduction in SP in this toy example is precisely the increase in P, the factors should offset one another, which keeps my level of deterrence constant.
Now, I grant you, this assumes a rather high degree of rationality from my hypothetical criminal. In the real world, I strongly doubt any actual criminals would reason quantitatively this way. But in the real world, I strongly doubt any actual criminals reason quantitatively from EB, SP, and p in the first place.
Well, retroactive changes to p tend to be much smaller since most evidence degrades with time.
Also in this case since the crime is attempting violent overthrow of the government retroactive changes in p are almost non-existent, after all a successful overthrow by its nature virtually eliminates your chances of getting punished for it.
That’s a fair point. So, yes: if p is effectively constant and SP is not, you’re right that that’s a good reason to keep applying the old SP to old prisoners. I stand corrected.
So are you saying the SP-setting strategy you’re proposing doesn’t apply to crimes that don’t destabilize the criminal justice system itself?
I’m saying what I said and hopefully what’s true, redo the calculations yourself if you like. Here I’m saying that if a crime has the potential to destabilize the criminal justice system itself, that should be taken into account when calculating p.