Perhaps I misunderstood what you meant by “reboot”. The situation you are describing now preserves continuity, therefore is not death. In the first situation, I assumed that information was being erased. Similarly, neural cellular death corrupts the entire program. If there was a way to instantly stop a human brain and restart the same brain later, that would not be death, but freezing yourself now does not accomplish that, nor does copying a brain.
(Unimportant note: it wasn’t I who brought up reboots.)
Anyway, I believe that’s why cryonics advocates believe it works. Their argument is that all relevant information is stored in the synapses, etc., which information about is preserved with sufficient fidelity during vitrification. I’m not sure about the current state of cryopreservatives, but a good enough antifreeze ought to be even able to vitrify neurons without ‘killing’ them. Meaning they can be restarted after thawing. In any case cellular death should not “corrupt the entire program” because as long as no important information is lost, we can repair it all.
I’m much less confident about the idea of uploading one’s mind into a computer as a way of survival since that involves all sorts of confusing stuff like copies and causality.
Perhaps I misunderstood what you meant by “reboot”. The situation you are describing now preserves continuity, therefore is not death. In the first situation, I assumed that information was being erased. Similarly, neural cellular death corrupts the entire program. If there was a way to instantly stop a human brain and restart the same brain later, that would not be death, but freezing yourself now does not accomplish that, nor does copying a brain.
(Unimportant note: it wasn’t I who brought up reboots.)
Anyway, I believe that’s why cryonics advocates believe it works. Their argument is that all relevant information is stored in the synapses, etc., which information about is preserved with sufficient fidelity during vitrification. I’m not sure about the current state of cryopreservatives, but a good enough antifreeze ought to be even able to vitrify neurons without ‘killing’ them. Meaning they can be restarted after thawing. In any case cellular death should not “corrupt the entire program” because as long as no important information is lost, we can repair it all.
I’m much less confident about the idea of uploading one’s mind into a computer as a way of survival since that involves all sorts of confusing stuff like copies and causality.