Dave thinks ‘whether E is an example of P’ is not a core point, Carol thinks (I presume) ‘whether there exist any examples of P’ is a core point, and it seems likely to me that both of these can be true and agreed upon by both parties.
These can both be true. But they also may not both be true—for instance, in cases where E is representative of a class of pseudo-examples (i.e., scenarios that have the property of seeming to be examples of P but not actually being examples of P). Similarly, ‘whether E is an example of P’ is often indeed a core point in virtue of ‘if E is not an example of P, why did Dave think that it is?’ being a core point; the latter question often goes to the heart of Dave’s view, and his reasons for holding it!
It also happens to empirically be the case that many (perhaps, most?) real-life analogues of Dave do not consider ‘whether there exist any examples of P’ to be a core point of their claims (or, at least, that is the strong impression one gets from the way in which they respond to inquiries about examples).
Finally, ‘does Dave have any actual examples of P’ is a very strong indicator—strong Bayesian evidence, if you want to view it that way—of whether we ought to believe P, or how seriously we ought to take Dave’s claims. (No, “just evaluate Dave’s argument, aside from examples” is not an acceptable response to this!)
… if Carol’s initial comment were ‘I don’t think E is an example of P, because … Also, I doubt that there are any examples of P at all—could you give another one, or address my misgivings about E?’ …
Doubting that there are any examples of P is not, so to speak, Carol’s job. The claim is that E is an example of P. The only reason Carol has for thinking that there are examples of P (excepting cases where P is something well-known, of which there are obviously many examples) is that Dave has described E to the reader. Once E is disqualified, Carol is back to having no particular reason to believe that there are any examples of P.
Once E is disqualified, it is (or it ought to be!) implied that supplying other examples of P is now incumbent upon Dave. Carol bears no obligation (either epistemic or rhetorical) to commit to any position on the question of “are there any examples of P”, in order for Dave to be faced with the need to provide replacement examples.
In short, I think that “having made a claim, has Dave in fact provided any actual examples of the claimed thing” is (barring edge cases) always a core point.
Doubting that there are any examples of P is not, so to speak, Carol’s job. The claim is that E is an example of P. The only reason Carol has for thinking that there are examples of P (excepting cases where P is something well-known, of which there are obviously many examples) is that Dave has described E to the reader. Once E is disqualified, Carol is back to having no particular reason to believe that there are any examples of P.
It seems to me that there’s likely to be enough cases where there are differences in opinion about whether P is well-known enough that examples aren’t needed, or whether P isn’t well-known but whether the reader upon hearing a definition could think of examples themselves, that it’s useful to have norms whereby we clarify whether or not we doubt that there examples of P.
All of the cases I am thinking of are those where P is a new concept, which the author is defining / describing / “crystallizing” for the first time. As such, it seems unlikely that this sort of edge case would apply.
I do agree that working examples are quite important (and that this is something authors should be encouraged to provide).
The issue I expect to be relevant to your past experience is different takes on which examples are valid.
(My impression is that it is often the case, esp. with discussions relating to internal mental states, that the author provides something that makes total sense to them, and me, but doesn’t make sense to you, and then you continuously ask for better/different examples when it seems like the underlying issue is that for whatever reason, the particular mental phenomena their referencing isn’t relevant to you.
How to resolve this seems like a different question that the rest of this thread is focusing on. But I think by this point a lot of people not-providing-you-in-particular-with-examples is because they don’t expect your criticism of their examples to be that useful.)
Oh, certainly this is a fair point. No argument there! But we can agree, I think, that “you say E is not an example of P, but I maintain that it is” is not at all the same thing as “you’re not addressing the core point”—yes?
These can both be true. But they also may not both be true—for instance, in cases where E is representative of a class of pseudo-examples (i.e., scenarios that have the property of seeming to be examples of P but not actually being examples of P). Similarly, ‘whether E is an example of P’ is often indeed a core point in virtue of ‘if E is not an example of P, why did Dave think that it is?’ being a core point; the latter question often goes to the heart of Dave’s view, and his reasons for holding it!
It also happens to empirically be the case that many (perhaps, most?) real-life analogues of Dave do not consider ‘whether there exist any examples of P’ to be a core point of their claims (or, at least, that is the strong impression one gets from the way in which they respond to inquiries about examples).
Finally, ‘does Dave have any actual examples of P’ is a very strong indicator—strong Bayesian evidence, if you want to view it that way—of whether we ought to believe P, or how seriously we ought to take Dave’s claims. (No, “just evaluate Dave’s argument, aside from examples” is not an acceptable response to this!)
Doubting that there are any examples of P is not, so to speak, Carol’s job. The claim is that E is an example of P. The only reason Carol has for thinking that there are examples of P (excepting cases where P is something well-known, of which there are obviously many examples) is that Dave has described E to the reader. Once E is disqualified, Carol is back to having no particular reason to believe that there are any examples of P.
Once E is disqualified, it is (or it ought to be!) implied that supplying other examples of P is now incumbent upon Dave. Carol bears no obligation (either epistemic or rhetorical) to commit to any position on the question of “are there any examples of P”, in order for Dave to be faced with the need to provide replacement examples.
In short, I think that “having made a claim, has Dave in fact provided any actual examples of the claimed thing” is (barring edge cases) always a core point.
It seems to me that there’s likely to be enough cases where there are differences in opinion about whether P is well-known enough that examples aren’t needed, or whether P isn’t well-known but whether the reader upon hearing a definition could think of examples themselves, that it’s useful to have norms whereby we clarify whether or not we doubt that there examples of P.
All of the cases I am thinking of are those where P is a new concept, which the author is defining / describing / “crystallizing” for the first time. As such, it seems unlikely that this sort of edge case would apply.
I do agree that working examples are quite important (and that this is something authors should be encouraged to provide).
The issue I expect to be relevant to your past experience is different takes on which examples are valid.
(My impression is that it is often the case, esp. with discussions relating to internal mental states, that the author provides something that makes total sense to them, and me, but doesn’t make sense to you, and then you continuously ask for better/different examples when it seems like the underlying issue is that for whatever reason, the particular mental phenomena their referencing isn’t relevant to you.
How to resolve this seems like a different question that the rest of this thread is focusing on. But I think by this point a lot of people not-providing-you-in-particular-with-examples is because they don’t expect your criticism of their examples to be that useful.)
Oh, certainly this is a fair point. No argument there! But we can agree, I think, that “you say E is not an example of P, but I maintain that it is” is not at all the same thing as “you’re not addressing the core point”—yes?