One difficulty with the least convenient possible world is where that least convenience is a significant change in the makeup of the human brain. For example, I don’t trust myself to make a decision about killing a traveler with sufficient moral abstraction from the day-to-day concerns of being a human. I don’t trust what I would become if I did kill a human. Or, if that’s insufficient, fill in a lack of trust in the decisionmaking in general for the moment. (Another example would be the ability to trust Omega in his responses)
Because once that’s a significant issue in the subject , then the least convenient possible world you’re asking me to imagine doesn’t include me—it includes some variant of me whose reactions I can predict, but not really access. Porting them back to me is also nontrivial.
One difficulty with the least convenient possible world is where that least convenience is a significant change in the makeup of the human brain. For example, I don’t trust myself to make a decision about killing a traveler with sufficient moral abstraction from the day-to-day concerns of being a human. I don’t trust what I would become if I did kill a human. Or, if that’s insufficient, fill in a lack of trust in the decisionmaking in general for the moment. (Another example would be the ability to trust Omega in his responses)
Because once that’s a significant issue in the subject , then the least convenient possible world you’re asking me to imagine doesn’t include me—it includes some variant of me whose reactions I can predict, but not really access. Porting them back to me is also nontrivial.
It is an interesting thought experiment, though.