It does. It just doesn’t if you accept the premise that intelligence is, in and of itself, good (and murder is not).
I accept that premise, of course, and your assertion that it was not intended to be generalized as such. But still, within the framework of this hipothetical world, that simply cannot be true. In fact, it cannot be relevant. It is not a moral question at all; more of an utility vs principles thing.
In the original Pascal’s Wager, as I recall, false (outwardly) adoration does score you points. I seem to recall him saying that “at least you wouldn’t be corrupting the youths” and “you may become convinced by habit”, at least.
So yeah, I would try my best (and probably fail) to aquire that reward, if it was shown to be worth it.
On the other hand, on such a world, it probably would not. Heaven for the weather, Hell for the company, et al.
It does. It just doesn’t if you accept the premise that intelligence is, in and of itself, good (and murder is not). I accept that premise, of course, and your assertion that it was not intended to be generalized as such. But still, within the framework of this hipothetical world, that simply cannot be true. In fact, it cannot be relevant. It is not a moral question at all; more of an utility vs principles thing.
In the original Pascal’s Wager, as I recall, false (outwardly) adoration does score you points. I seem to recall him saying that “at least you wouldn’t be corrupting the youths” and “you may become convinced by habit”, at least. So yeah, I would try my best (and probably fail) to aquire that reward, if it was shown to be worth it. On the other hand, on such a world, it probably would not. Heaven for the weather, Hell for the company, et al.