The usefulness may not reduce the sincerity of the liking, but it certainly reduces the depth. If Steve gives me stuff, and I like him because of that usefulness, and then Steve stops giving me stuff… JRM no more like Steve. Viewing friendships as exchanges isn’t evil or wrong, but if it’s usefulness that’s the prime driver, that’s a different sort of friendship than one I really want.
There are qualities that are troublesome that aren’t physically dangerous. Affiliating yourself mentally with people who don’t care so much about the truth is likely to rub off. I’d like to think of myself as a particularly resilient and incorruptible person, but there’s a certain necessary diligence to retain that self-view (which I believe is related to actual resilience and incorruptibility.)
On liking people not being counterproductive to changing behaviors: You might be right. I was considering the (perhaps) increased willingness to tolerate troublesome behavior and the reward function of friendships coming to those who are troublesome in some serious way. It may depend on the people involved. Or I might just be wrong.
I think when we look at petty problems to determine dislikes (She likes the mundane and stupid American Idol, while I like the brilliant and intellectual Top Chef), that is indeed counterproductive. But most of the limited number of people I take an active dislike to.… I don’t want to try to be their friends. At all. And I think the world is a better place for my lack of trying.
I think the more serious and common error is to put up with malfeasing people past the point it’s reasonable. I also think people tend to trust statements from others overmuch, even when that person has a track record of untrustworthiness. For most, a post on “Staying Away From Hazardous Humans You Like,” would be more beneficial.
I don’t think this necessarily follows. If Steve stops giving you stuff, he’s still the guy who gave you stuff; you can still value him for the generosity/skill at picking out gifts/thoughtfulness/etc. that he exhibited then; and you can still think kindly of him whenever you use something he gave you.
Can you go into more detail on how these things may rub off?
:)
I don’t think you should be friends with everyone. But if you find that you do want to be friends with someone, it’s good to be able to.
I believe or disbelieve or am suspicious of statements by others for reasons other than how much I like them. (I do factor in my model of how much they like me, as I believe people are less likely to lie to people they like; but this doesn’t affect their epistemic hygiene, their background knowledge, their skills at rationality, or their susceptibility to fallacy.)
(I do factor in my model of how much they like me, as I believe people are less likely
to lie to people they like; but this doesn’t affect their epistemic hygiene, their
background knowledge, their skills at rationality, or their susceptibility to fallacy.)
I could conceive of situations where friends would be more likely to lie than strangers. A friend may lie about their actions if they care about your opinion of them and not care as much about the stranger’s opinion of them.
However, it may very well be that people who I like practice better epistemic hygiene. Indeed, I’ve found simply being around people who are more careful thinkers forces one to switch into a more careful thinking mode, because if you don’t, they’ll tear you into little tiny pieces. However, that probably doesn’t matter that much since detailed interaction can probably get you a better idea of how the person thinks more than this rough heuristic.
The usefulness may not reduce the sincerity of the liking, but it certainly reduces the depth. If Steve gives me stuff, and I like him because of that usefulness, and then Steve stops giving me stuff… JRM no more like Steve. Viewing friendships as exchanges isn’t evil or wrong, but if it’s usefulness that’s the prime driver, that’s a different sort of friendship than one I really want.
There are qualities that are troublesome that aren’t physically dangerous. Affiliating yourself mentally with people who don’t care so much about the truth is likely to rub off. I’d like to think of myself as a particularly resilient and incorruptible person, but there’s a certain necessary diligence to retain that self-view (which I believe is related to actual resilience and incorruptibility.)
On liking people not being counterproductive to changing behaviors: You might be right. I was considering the (perhaps) increased willingness to tolerate troublesome behavior and the reward function of friendships coming to those who are troublesome in some serious way. It may depend on the people involved. Or I might just be wrong.
I think when we look at petty problems to determine dislikes (She likes the mundane and stupid American Idol, while I like the brilliant and intellectual Top Chef), that is indeed counterproductive. But most of the limited number of people I take an active dislike to.… I don’t want to try to be their friends. At all. And I think the world is a better place for my lack of trying.
I think the more serious and common error is to put up with malfeasing people past the point it’s reasonable. I also think people tend to trust statements from others overmuch, even when that person has a track record of untrustworthiness. For most, a post on “Staying Away From Hazardous Humans You Like,” would be more beneficial.
--JRM
I don’t think this necessarily follows. If Steve stops giving you stuff, he’s still the guy who gave you stuff; you can still value him for the generosity/skill at picking out gifts/thoughtfulness/etc. that he exhibited then; and you can still think kindly of him whenever you use something he gave you.
Can you go into more detail on how these things may rub off?
:)
I don’t think you should be friends with everyone. But if you find that you do want to be friends with someone, it’s good to be able to.
I believe or disbelieve or am suspicious of statements by others for reasons other than how much I like them. (I do factor in my model of how much they like me, as I believe people are less likely to lie to people they like; but this doesn’t affect their epistemic hygiene, their background knowledge, their skills at rationality, or their susceptibility to fallacy.)
I could conceive of situations where friends would be more likely to lie than strangers. A friend may lie about their actions if they care about your opinion of them and not care as much about the stranger’s opinion of them.
However, it may very well be that people who I like practice better epistemic hygiene. Indeed, I’ve found simply being around people who are more careful thinkers forces one to switch into a more careful thinking mode, because if you don’t, they’ll tear you into little tiny pieces. However, that probably doesn’t matter that much since detailed interaction can probably get you a better idea of how the person thinks more than this rough heuristic.