hm, to be more clear, current-me is a point in thingspace which just happens to exist in the physical universe as I’m typing this, not necessarily a physical object.
One point in thingspace cannot be identical to any different object in thingspace, yes. I’m not sure I understand how the last sentence follows?
A single “frame” of ete five minutes ago is not equal to the frame “ete now”, but both fall near or on the center of ete now’s physically embodied concept of “I”, therefore both can be meaningfully described as “I” even if they are slightly different from each other.
I do not understand how a point in thingspace can be not necessarily a physical object. I thought the point of thingspace was that it contained nothing but things (and especially no identities).
Other than that, we seem to pretty much agree. I’m merely saying that the judgement that your two frames can be meaningfully described as “I” is happening inside your conceptspace, and in the conceptspaces of those frames that agree, rather than anywhere in thingspace.
Should have said existent physical object. Each point in thingspace is a possible configuration of matter, but not all possible configurations of matter necessarily exist (see the post on Logical Zombies). It’s a Big Universe so maybe all possibles exist, but my point was to differentiate the abstract “this is an abstract possible configuration of matter” from the “this is a particular instance of this configuration of matter”.
For the last part.. yes, I think, kind of? The concepts are being processed by a physical brain, which means in a significant sense the judgement must be being made by a physical object, but at the same time the physical embodiment of that concept in the brain is key to the judgement so the concept is vital.
hm, to be more clear, current-me is a point in thingspace which just happens to exist in the physical universe as I’m typing this, not necessarily a physical object.
One point in thingspace cannot be identical to any different object in thingspace, yes. I’m not sure I understand how the last sentence follows?
A single “frame” of ete five minutes ago is not equal to the frame “ete now”, but both fall near or on the center of ete now’s physically embodied concept of “I”, therefore both can be meaningfully described as “I” even if they are slightly different from each other.
I do not understand how a point in thingspace can be not necessarily a physical object. I thought the point of thingspace was that it contained nothing but things (and especially no identities).
Other than that, we seem to pretty much agree. I’m merely saying that the judgement that your two frames can be meaningfully described as “I” is happening inside your conceptspace, and in the conceptspaces of those frames that agree, rather than anywhere in thingspace.
Should have said existent physical object. Each point in thingspace is a possible configuration of matter, but not all possible configurations of matter necessarily exist (see the post on Logical Zombies). It’s a Big Universe so maybe all possibles exist, but my point was to differentiate the abstract “this is an abstract possible configuration of matter” from the “this is a particular instance of this configuration of matter”.
For the last part.. yes, I think, kind of? The concepts are being processed by a physical brain, which means in a significant sense the judgement must be being made by a physical object, but at the same time the physical embodiment of that concept in the brain is key to the judgement so the concept is vital.