The OP isn’t saying that analysis based on necessary-and-sufficient conditions (hereafter nasc) is valueless, he’s saying that philosophy that assumes people ordinarily categorize using nasc is misguided philosophy.
he’s saying that philosophy that assumes people ordinarily categorize using nasc is misguided philosophy.
Yes, that looks like a more accurate reading than the one I’d made. But, in that case, I think that Luke is incorrect to say that “much of 20th century conceptual analysis seems to” make that assumption. Philosophers who do conceptual analysis aren’t making that assumption any more than were the mathematicians who NASC-ified pre-formal concepts about quantity or geometry.
It is one thing to suppose that there exists, in some ideal sense, a list of predicates satisfied by all and only the things that you would call “knowledge”. Conceptual analysts do hope to find such a list. They assume that such a list is “out there” to be found. But they don’t necessarily assume that your brain, when it encounters a possible case of knowledge, actually runs down an explicit list of predicates and checks each against the given case before deciding to call it “knowledge”. They might think that we would be better off if we had such a list and used it in that way, but they don’t necessarily assume that that is how the brain does things now.
The distinction is important because conceptual analysis does seem to be a mistake. (Luke has done a good job of documenting this.) It’s a mistake even though it doesn’t make this assumption about how the brain works. Conceptual analysts are still guilty of the mistake even if they say, “Well, I’m not assuming that the brain actually works that way.” By giving a fake reason for why conceptual analysis is a mistake, we fool ourselves about what we need to do to avoid the mistake.
Agreed that modeling human knowledge as a NASC-list is different from asserting that human brains represent beliefs via NASC-lists.
I am insufficiently versed in academic philosophy to be entitled to an opinion as to whether modern philosophers who do conceptual analysis are doing the former or the latter.
Agreed that if modern philosophers as a rule don’t actually do the latter, then arguing that they’re misguided for doing so is at best a waste of time, at worst actively deceptive.
The OP isn’t saying that analysis based on necessary-and-sufficient conditions (hereafter nasc) is valueless, he’s saying that philosophy that assumes people ordinarily categorize using nasc is misguided philosophy.
Yes, that looks like a more accurate reading than the one I’d made. But, in that case, I think that Luke is incorrect to say that “much of 20th century conceptual analysis seems to” make that assumption. Philosophers who do conceptual analysis aren’t making that assumption any more than were the mathematicians who NASC-ified pre-formal concepts about quantity or geometry.
It is one thing to suppose that there exists, in some ideal sense, a list of predicates satisfied by all and only the things that you would call “knowledge”. Conceptual analysts do hope to find such a list. They assume that such a list is “out there” to be found. But they don’t necessarily assume that your brain, when it encounters a possible case of knowledge, actually runs down an explicit list of predicates and checks each against the given case before deciding to call it “knowledge”. They might think that we would be better off if we had such a list and used it in that way, but they don’t necessarily assume that that is how the brain does things now.
The distinction is important because conceptual analysis does seem to be a mistake. (Luke has done a good job of documenting this.) It’s a mistake even though it doesn’t make this assumption about how the brain works. Conceptual analysts are still guilty of the mistake even if they say, “Well, I’m not assuming that the brain actually works that way.” By giving a fake reason for why conceptual analysis is a mistake, we fool ourselves about what we need to do to avoid the mistake.
Agreed that modeling human knowledge as a NASC-list is different from asserting that human brains represent beliefs via NASC-lists.
I am insufficiently versed in academic philosophy to be entitled to an opinion as to whether modern philosophers who do conceptual analysis are doing the former or the latter.
Agreed that if modern philosophers as a rule don’t actually do the latter, then arguing that they’re misguided for doing so is at best a waste of time, at worst actively deceptive.