I have a question about the digital reconstruction/revival/uploading/etc. How do you know it’s truly you? Do you wake up and just see you’re now in a computer?
I might be missing something, but the process in my head (heh) is that the brain is being copied, analyzed and then booted on the computer. Then there’s two copies of the person, and while the biological brain will eventually die, the brain ex machina will still be living.
However, the brain ex machina, even though it’s an identical copy, is not the same person. Therefore, it’s more like personality-immortality, or brain-data-immortality. The person’s conscious experience will be branched off until the brain dies.
I thought immortality implies that you actually stay conscious, not that you die for a hundred percent but are preserved.
The reconstruction plan is divided in two tasks: creating exact model of person and solving identity problem. I assume here that in the future identity problem will be solved. In this map I just do not touch it. But I have separate map in progress (and 100 pages text) where I try to address this problem.
Basically, solving identity problem depends of how one solve problem of consciousness and nature of reality.
If one assume that mind is only information, than where is no problems with copies. Any human have many future copies, like me-tomorrow me-day-after-tomorrow.
If you have a model of mind, where identity depends of something which is not information, you must invest in preserving exactly it, but not the information. This thing may be named “essence of identity”, and most popular such essence is “continuity of consciousness” (But also it may be qualia, soul etc).
Anyway I hope that even if the essence of identity is real, we will built separate mechanisms to transfer it from the brain to the computer (like gradual uploading or preserving small part of the brain with active electric process).
But as the problem of identity is not solved yet, the plan C is poor and should be done only after plans A and B fails.
If my brain is dying it is better to have my copy in a computer than don’t have anything. Using indexical trick as identity transfer mechanism may also help in this case: if I don’t know am I in computer or not.
I have a question about the digital reconstruction/revival/uploading/etc. How do you know it’s truly you? Do you wake up and just see you’re now in a computer?
I might be missing something, but the process in my head (heh) is that the brain is being copied, analyzed and then booted on the computer. Then there’s two copies of the person, and while the biological brain will eventually die, the brain ex machina will still be living.
However, the brain ex machina, even though it’s an identical copy, is not the same person. Therefore, it’s more like personality-immortality, or brain-data-immortality. The person’s conscious experience will be branched off until the brain dies.
I thought immortality implies that you actually stay conscious, not that you die for a hundred percent but are preserved.
The reconstruction plan is divided in two tasks: creating exact model of person and solving identity problem. I assume here that in the future identity problem will be solved. In this map I just do not touch it. But I have separate map in progress (and 100 pages text) where I try to address this problem.
Basically, solving identity problem depends of how one solve problem of consciousness and nature of reality. If one assume that mind is only information, than where is no problems with copies. Any human have many future copies, like me-tomorrow me-day-after-tomorrow.
If you have a model of mind, where identity depends of something which is not information, you must invest in preserving exactly it, but not the information. This thing may be named “essence of identity”, and most popular such essence is “continuity of consciousness” (But also it may be qualia, soul etc).
Anyway I hope that even if the essence of identity is real, we will built separate mechanisms to transfer it from the brain to the computer (like gradual uploading or preserving small part of the brain with active electric process). But as the problem of identity is not solved yet, the plan C is poor and should be done only after plans A and B fails.
If my brain is dying it is better to have my copy in a computer than don’t have anything. Using indexical trick as identity transfer mechanism may also help in this case: if I don’t know am I in computer or not.
Where you draw the line on these sorts of things is personal preference. The “copy” can’t tell he’s a copy.