I don’t understand what coherent theory of causation could make this statement true.
The issue is not causality. The issue is moral responsibility. If I go postal and start shooting people as they run past my house and later tell the police that it was because my neighbor pissed me off, the neighbor may have been one (of many) causes but should not be held morally responsible for my actions.
Likewise, if the king asks someone a question and, in response, kills ten people, I do not see how the question asks makes any different in the assignment of moral responsibility.
Causality does not imply moral responsibility.
Also, having read the link you gave earlier, I can now comment on this:
The idea that [the King is responsible for the deaths] screens off the possibility that [the 11th man is responsible for the deaths] seems to be a version of the single-true-cause fallacy. Sure, the king is responsible, but given the king’s actions, it’s the 11th man’s choice that directly determines whether the others will live or not.
“Responsible” has two meanings. The first is a cause-effect sense of “these actions precluded these other actions.” This is the same as saying a bowling ball is responsible for the bowling pins falling over.
The other is a moral judgement stating “this person should be held accountable for this evil.” The bowling ball holds no moral responsibility because it was thrown by a bowler.
I am not claiming that the eleventh man was not part of the causal chain that resulted in ten people dying. I am claiming that the eleventh man holds no moral responsibility for the ten people dying. I am not trying to say that the king is the single-true-cause. I am claiming that the king is the one who should be held morally responsible.
To belabor this point with one more example: If I rigged a door to blow up when opened and Jack opened the door while standing next to Jill they are both reduced to goo. Jack is causally responsible for what happened because he opened the door. He is not, however, morally responsible.
The question of when someone does become morally responsible is tricky and I do not have a good example of when I think the line is crossed. I do not, however, pass any blame on the eleventh man for answer a question to which there is no correct answer.
The issue is not causality. The issue is moral responsibility.
Agreed. But I think if you want to separate the two, you need a reasonable account of the distinction. One plausible account relies on reasonably foreseeable consequences to ground responsibility, and this is pretty much my view. It accounts easily for the neighbor, bowling ball, and Jack and Jill cases, but still implies responsibility for the 11th man.
I can accept a view that says that, all things considered, the king has a greater causal influence on the outcome of the 11th man case, and thus bears much greater moral responsibility for it than does the 11th man. But (and this was the point of the no-single-true-cause analogy) I see no reason why this should imply that the 11th man has no responsibility whatsoever, given that the death of 10 innocent others is a clearly foreseeable consequence of his choice.
I still think this is a convenient conclusion designed to let you be selfish without feeling like you’re doing anything wrong.
P.S. FWIW, yes I pretty much do think you’re evil if you’re not willing to sacrifice $100 to save 10 lives in your hostage example. I can understand not being willing to die, even if I think it would be morally better to sacrifice oneself. (And I readily confess that it’s possible that I would take the morally wrong/weak choice if actually faced with this situation.) But for $100 I wouldn’t hesitate.
One plausible account relies on reasonably foreseeable consequences to ground responsibility, and this is pretty much my view.
I can understand that. I have not dug quite so deeply into this area of my ethical map so it could be representing the territory poorly. What little mental exercises I have done have led me to this point.
I guess the example that really puts me in a pickle is asking what would happen if Jack knew the door was rigged but opened it anyway. It makes sense that Jack shares the blame. There seems to be something in me that says the physical action weighs against Jack.
So, if I had to write it up quickly:
Being a physical cause in a chain of events that leads to harm
While knowing the physical action has a high likelihood of leading to harm
Is evil
But, on the other hand:
Being a non-physical cause in a chain of events that leads to harm
While knowing the non-physical action has a high likelihood of leading to harm
Is not necessarily evil but can be sometimes
Weird. That sure seems like an inconsistency to me. Looks like I need to get the mapmaking tools out. The stickiness of the eleventh man is that the king is another moral entity and the king somehow shrouds the eleventh from actually making a moral choice. But I do not have justification for that distinction.
There may yet be justification, but working backwards is not proper. Once I get the whole thing worked out I will report what I find, if you are interested.
I don’t understand what coherent theory of causation could make this statement true.
If they could stop it, then yes, they are.
The issue is not causality. The issue is moral responsibility. If I go postal and start shooting people as they run past my house and later tell the police that it was because my neighbor pissed me off, the neighbor may have been one (of many) causes but should not be held morally responsible for my actions.
Likewise, if the king asks someone a question and, in response, kills ten people, I do not see how the question asks makes any different in the assignment of moral responsibility.
Causality does not imply moral responsibility.
Also, having read the link you gave earlier, I can now comment on this:
“Responsible” has two meanings. The first is a cause-effect sense of “these actions precluded these other actions.” This is the same as saying a bowling ball is responsible for the bowling pins falling over.
The other is a moral judgement stating “this person should be held accountable for this evil.” The bowling ball holds no moral responsibility because it was thrown by a bowler.
I am not claiming that the eleventh man was not part of the causal chain that resulted in ten people dying. I am claiming that the eleventh man holds no moral responsibility for the ten people dying. I am not trying to say that the king is the single-true-cause. I am claiming that the king is the one who should be held morally responsible.
To belabor this point with one more example: If I rigged a door to blow up when opened and Jack opened the door while standing next to Jill they are both reduced to goo. Jack is causally responsible for what happened because he opened the door. He is not, however, morally responsible.
The question of when someone does become morally responsible is tricky and I do not have a good example of when I think the line is crossed. I do not, however, pass any blame on the eleventh man for answer a question to which there is no correct answer.
Agreed. But I think if you want to separate the two, you need a reasonable account of the distinction. One plausible account relies on reasonably foreseeable consequences to ground responsibility, and this is pretty much my view. It accounts easily for the neighbor, bowling ball, and Jack and Jill cases, but still implies responsibility for the 11th man.
I can accept a view that says that, all things considered, the king has a greater causal influence on the outcome of the 11th man case, and thus bears much greater moral responsibility for it than does the 11th man. But (and this was the point of the no-single-true-cause analogy) I see no reason why this should imply that the 11th man has no responsibility whatsoever, given that the death of 10 innocent others is a clearly foreseeable consequence of his choice.
I still think this is a convenient conclusion designed to let you be selfish without feeling like you’re doing anything wrong.
P.S. FWIW, yes I pretty much do think you’re evil if you’re not willing to sacrifice $100 to save 10 lives in your hostage example. I can understand not being willing to die, even if I think it would be morally better to sacrifice oneself. (And I readily confess that it’s possible that I would take the morally wrong/weak choice if actually faced with this situation.) But for $100 I wouldn’t hesitate.
I can understand that. I have not dug quite so deeply into this area of my ethical map so it could be representing the territory poorly. What little mental exercises I have done have led me to this point.
I guess the example that really puts me in a pickle is asking what would happen if Jack knew the door was rigged but opened it anyway. It makes sense that Jack shares the blame. There seems to be something in me that says the physical action weighs against Jack.
So, if I had to write it up quickly:
Being a physical cause in a chain of events that leads to harm
While knowing the physical action has a high likelihood of leading to harm
Is evil
But, on the other hand:
Being a non-physical cause in a chain of events that leads to harm
While knowing the non-physical action has a high likelihood of leading to harm
Is not necessarily evil but can be sometimes
Weird. That sure seems like an inconsistency to me. Looks like I need to get the mapmaking tools out. The stickiness of the eleventh man is that the king is another moral entity and the king somehow shrouds the eleventh from actually making a moral choice. But I do not have justification for that distinction.
There may yet be justification, but working backwards is not proper. Once I get the whole thing worked out I will report what I find, if you are interested.
Good luck with the map-making! I’d certainly be interested to know what you find, if and when you find it.