either “vampire” nor “werewolf” refer successfully to anything
In the sense I’m talking about, references need not have referents, hence “the nearest vampire” may be a valid reference.
Anyway, in this case it would be generally taken to be the case that the world exists, so there isn’t a problem with failure to refer.
True of our pretheoretic notion of water.
Yes, which doesn’t have a physicalist definition. I don’t think we’re disagreeing about the need for a philosophy that can ontologize both phenomena that do and don’t have physical definitions, and bridge between them. Donald Hobson seemed to be saying that the uncertainty can be expressed using a physicalist ontology.
People could ask for water at times when there was no theory.
I agree with this, my point is that it isn’t meaningful to say H20 theory is true independent of the theory’s connections with already-known-about phenomena such as pre-chemistry water.
In the sense I’m talking about, references need not have referents, hence “the nearest vampire” may be a valid reference.
Anyway, in this case it would be generally taken to be the case that the world exists, so there isn’t a problem with failure to refer.
Yes, which doesn’t have a physicalist definition. I don’t think we’re disagreeing about the need for a philosophy that can ontologize both phenomena that do and don’t have physical definitions, and bridge between them. Donald Hobson seemed to be saying that the uncertainty can be expressed using a physicalist ontology.
I agree with this, my point is that it isn’t meaningful to say H20 theory is true independent of the theory’s connections with already-known-about phenomena such as pre-chemistry water.
I don’t know who you are think is doing that.