It could be argued that physical law is standpoint-independent, because it is, symmetrically, true at each point in space-time. However, this excludes virtual standpoints (e.g. existing in a computer simulation), and additionally, this only means the laws are standpoint-independent, not the contents of the world, the things described by the laws.
It is not enough to say that physics does not show that fundamental entities are standpoint-independent, you need a positive reason to assert that they are standpoint dependent. In this article, as in all your others, you argue that indexicality or standpoint-dependence is fundamental or basic in some unspecified sense … and then go on to treat them as fundamental or basic in a specifically ontological sense. Since “fundamental” means more than one thing, you need to show that standpoints are ontologically fundamental, not just epistemically or semantically.
Now, expanding out this account needs to provide an account of the relation between provisional and ultimate truth. Even if such an account could be provided, it would appear that, in our current state, we must accept it as provisionally true that some mental entities (e.g. imagination) do not have physical definitions, since a good-enough account has not yet been provided.
I don’t see why imagination would be any harder than visual qualia, but anyway...
What you say above is only a problem if reductionism is regarded as some kind of universal truth. That is the way it is regarded around here...
“Also referred to as “the LEGO principle;” the idea
that things are made of parts, and that a correct and
thorough understanding of the parts and their inter-
actions is equivalent to an understanding of the whole.
Metaphorically speaking, if one has explained the
trees, shrubs, and fauna in all of their relevant detail,
one has explained the forest; there is no ephemeral
“missing” property that is forest-ness.” (CFAR handbook)
.. but not in the mainstream. In the mainstream, reductionism is seen as as a methodology that sometimes works, or a falsifiable hypothesis. Meaning, that it is already granted that it could fail.
Incidentally, function is an uncontentious exception to reductionism. Money is whatever performs the function of money, not something with specific physical characteristics. Money can be gold coins, cowrie shells, coded numbers, etc.
A philosophical account of reductionism needs to be able to discuss how this happens. To do this, it needs to be able to discuss the ontological status of entities such as “water” (pre-chemistry) that do not yet have a physical definition.
“Water” in quotes has the ontological status: word. For the physicalist, “water” always referred to H2O, even before it was known that water was H2O. This requires a theory of , as it were, unintentional reference, which might be a problem, but, if so, it is a problem of semantics, not reductionism.
Believing in observers leads to the typical mind-body problems.
It depends how strongly you believe in them. For most purposes, physics can be done with automatic recording devices. OTOH, conscious observers exist.
This is already pretty wonky. Indexicality makes the view-from-nowhere problematic.
Remember, you have only established that indexicality is needed for reference, ie. semantic, not that it applies to entities in themselves.
And the idea that “I” am “randomly” placed into a body is a rather strange metaphysics (when and where does this event happen?).
Well, it’s rather dualistic metaphysics. If you are your body, then there is no coincidence, because identity is not coincidence.
What sort of functions does a mind have? Observation, prediction, planning, modeling, acting, and so on. Now, the million-dollar question: Who is (actually or potentially) using it for these functions?
You are treating two different definitions of “function”—“performed on another’s behalf” and “multiply realisable”—as equivalent.
This is not much of a problem if we’ve already accepted fundamental deixis and rejected the view-from-nowhere. But it is a problem for those who haven’t.
You seem to be using “could” to refer to what other people mean by “counterfactual”. Counterfactuals are mainly a problem to those who accept determinism.
Hence, it is hard to say that “coulds” exist in a standpoint-independent way.
No, it’s easy: standpoint-independence plus indeterminism.
you need a positive reason to assert that they are standpoint dependent
“Fundamental entity” is a reference and references are deictic.
In the mainstream, reductionism is seen as as a methodology that sometimes works, or a falsifiable hypothesis. Meaning, that it is already granted that it could fail.
I am certainly not intending to argue against this methodological reductionism, rather only physicalism as “universal truth”.
For most purposes, physics can be done with automatic recording devices.
Still needs an account of what is a recording device, in physicalist terms. Which things do the theory-building thingies try to explain? Rocks could be said to be “automatic recording devices” but they don’t provide the data fed into theory-building processes (unless another recording device is observing the rock). This perhaps isn’t the same as consciousness per se but has similar problems.
Remember, you have only established that indexicality is needed for reference, ie. semantic, not that it applies to entities in themselves.
Is “entities in themselves” a reference or not? If so then indexicality applies. If not then what is it? As Wittgenstein noted, “That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.”
You are treating two different definitions of “function”—“performed on another’s behalf” and “multiply realisable”—as equivalent.
Paradigmatic functions are performed on someone’s behalf, so an account of functions not performed on anyone’s behalf needs to add detail on top of the “function” analogy. I am not positively asserting that no such account exist, just that it isn’t obvious. (I believe in multiple realizability)
No, it’s easy: standpoint-independence plus indeterminism.
I agree my argument doesn’t apply under indeterminism (there would be no such Laplace’s demon).
It is not enough to say that physics does not show that fundamental entities are standpoint-independent, you need a positive reason to assert that they are standpoint dependent. In this article, as in all your others, you argue that indexicality or standpoint-dependence is fundamental or basic in some unspecified sense … and then go on to treat them as fundamental or basic in a specifically ontological sense. Since “fundamental” means more than one thing, you need to show that standpoints are ontologically fundamental, not just epistemically or semantically.
I don’t see why imagination would be any harder than visual qualia, but anyway...
What you say above is only a problem if reductionism is regarded as some kind of universal truth. That is the way it is regarded around here...
“Also referred to as “the LEGO principle;” the idea that things are made of parts, and that a correct and thorough understanding of the parts and their inter- actions is equivalent to an understanding of the whole. Metaphorically speaking, if one has explained the trees, shrubs, and fauna in all of their relevant detail, one has explained the forest; there is no ephemeral “missing” property that is forest-ness.” (CFAR handbook)
.. but not in the mainstream. In the mainstream, reductionism is seen as as a methodology that sometimes works, or a falsifiable hypothesis. Meaning, that it is already granted that it could fail.
Incidentally, function is an uncontentious exception to reductionism. Money is whatever performs the function of money, not something with specific physical characteristics. Money can be gold coins, cowrie shells, coded numbers, etc.
“Water” in quotes has the ontological status: word. For the physicalist, “water” always referred to H2O, even before it was known that water was H2O. This requires a theory of , as it were, unintentional reference, which might be a problem, but, if so, it is a problem of semantics, not reductionism.
It depends how strongly you believe in them. For most purposes, physics can be done with automatic recording devices. OTOH, conscious observers exist.
Remember, you have only established that indexicality is needed for reference, ie. semantic, not that it applies to entities in themselves.
Well, it’s rather dualistic metaphysics. If you are your body, then there is no coincidence, because identity is not coincidence.
You are treating two different definitions of “function”—“performed on another’s behalf” and “multiply realisable”—as equivalent.
You seem to be using “could” to refer to what other people mean by “counterfactual”. Counterfactuals are mainly a problem to those who accept determinism.
No, it’s easy: standpoint-independence plus indeterminism.
“Fundamental entity” is a reference and references are deictic.
I am certainly not intending to argue against this methodological reductionism, rather only physicalism as “universal truth”.
Still needs an account of what is a recording device, in physicalist terms. Which things do the theory-building thingies try to explain? Rocks could be said to be “automatic recording devices” but they don’t provide the data fed into theory-building processes (unless another recording device is observing the rock). This perhaps isn’t the same as consciousness per se but has similar problems.
Is “entities in themselves” a reference or not? If so then indexicality applies. If not then what is it? As Wittgenstein noted, “That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.”
Paradigmatic functions are performed on someone’s behalf, so an account of functions not performed on anyone’s behalf needs to add detail on top of the “function” analogy. I am not positively asserting that no such account exist, just that it isn’t obvious. (I believe in multiple realizability)
I agree my argument doesn’t apply under indeterminism (there would be no such Laplace’s demon).
You haven’t shown that every reference is deictic. In particular ,you haven’t shown that references to classes are deictic.
I don’t see why that would be a major problem.
Thats gainsaying my point. I say that “function” has several barely related meanings ,you say there is a single “paradigmatic” meaning.