I still don’t see how statements about disposition in your sense are supposed to have an objective truth value (what does someone look like in visually simplified?), and why you think this disposition is supposed to better correlate with peoples predictions about decisions than the non-random component of the decision making process (total disposition) does (or why you think this concept is useful if it doesn’t), but I suspect discussing this further won’t lead anywhere.
Let’s try leaving the disposition discussion aside for a moment: You are postulating a scenario where someone spontaneously changes from a one-boxer into a two-boxer after the predictor has already made the prediction, just long enough to open the right hand box and collect the $1000. Is that right? And the question is whether I should regret not being able to change myself back into a one boxer in time to refuse the $1000?
Obviously if my behavior in this case was completely uncorrelated to the odds of finding the $1,000,000 box empty I should not. But the normal assumption for cases where your behavior is unpredictable (e. g. when you are using a quantum coin) is that P(two box) = P ( left box empty). Otherwise I would try to contrive to one-box with a probability of just over 0.5. So the details depend on P.
If P>0.001 (I’m assuming constant utility per dollar, which is unrealistic) my expected dollars before opening the left box have been reduced, and I bitterly regret my temporary lapse from sanity since it might have costed me $1,000,000. The rationale is the same as in the normal Newcomb problem.
If P<0.001 my expected dollars right at that point have increased, and according to some possible decision theories that one-box I should not regret the spontaneous change, since I already know I was lucky. But nevertheless my overall expected payoff in all branches is lower than it would be if temporary lapses like that were not possible. Since I’m a Counterfactual muggee I regret not being able to prevent the two-boxing, but am happy enough with the outcome for that particular instance of me.
I still don’t see how statements about disposition in your sense are supposed to have an objective truth value (what does someone look like in visually simplified?), and why you think this disposition is supposed to better correlate with peoples predictions about decisions than the non-random component of the decision making process (total disposition) does (or why you think this concept is useful if it doesn’t), but I suspect discussing this further won’t lead anywhere.
Let’s try leaving the disposition discussion aside for a moment: You are postulating a scenario where someone spontaneously changes from a one-boxer into a two-boxer after the predictor has already made the prediction, just long enough to open the right hand box and collect the $1000. Is that right? And the question is whether I should regret not being able to change myself back into a one boxer in time to refuse the $1000?
Obviously if my behavior in this case was completely uncorrelated to the odds of finding the $1,000,000 box empty I should not. But the normal assumption for cases where your behavior is unpredictable (e. g. when you are using a quantum coin) is that P(two box) = P ( left box empty). Otherwise I would try to contrive to one-box with a probability of just over 0.5. So the details depend on P.
If P>0.001 (I’m assuming constant utility per dollar, which is unrealistic) my expected dollars before opening the left box have been reduced, and I bitterly regret my temporary lapse from sanity since it might have costed me $1,000,000. The rationale is the same as in the normal Newcomb problem.
If P<0.001 my expected dollars right at that point have increased, and according to some possible decision theories that one-box I should not regret the spontaneous change, since I already know I was lucky. But nevertheless my overall expected payoff in all branches is lower than it would be if temporary lapses like that were not possible. Since I’m a Counterfactual muggee I regret not being able to prevent the two-boxing, but am happy enough with the outcome for that particular instance of me.