Not really. Pascal’s Wager’s domain is afterlives, about which we know nothing (either because they’re false or because no one can tell us anything). But cryonics has its domain over future possibilities, about which we can know things and so can assign meaningful prior estimates.
While we certainly can think of errant possibilia that make cryonics bad, they are notably errant, requiring us to posit a future incredibly unlike the present, the past and the kinds of changes we see in the world.
Not really. Pascal’s Wager’s domain is afterlives, about which we know nothing (either because they’re false or because no one can tell us anything). But cryonics has its domain over future possibilities, about which we can know things and so can assign meaningful prior estimates.
I’m not sure that this distinction is important to the argument. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that evidence is discovered which allows one to assign meaningful probabilities to the claim that accepting Jesus will guaranty a trip to heaven for eternity after one’s death. Let’s further suppose that this probability is roughly one in one billion. Would that change anything about the argument? I don’t think so. Pascal’s wager would still have the same basic flaws.
While we certainly can think of errant possibilia that make cryonics bad, they are notably errant, requiring us to posit a future incredibly unlike the present, the past and the kinds of changes we see in the world.
I’m not sure I would put it at “incredibly unlike the present.” After all, there is a lot of hostility to cryonics. And history shows that politics can be pretty chaotic.
Still, you seem to agree that one can make a meaningful estimate of the probability that future public policy will make people worse off for having chosen to sign up for cryonics. So what’s your rough estimate of that probability?
The problem with this is that, once we assign meaningful probabilities to Pascal’s Wager, the conceit succeeds or fails based on those probabilities.
I don’t see why that’s a problem. If somehow it were known that there is a 1 in 3 chance that accepting Jesus would lead to an eternity in heaven, then Pascal’s wager would start to make a lot more sense.
My estimate of a dystopian future in which you’d rather be dead than alive and, yet, somehow you are awakened into that world: basically zero.
That’s not an answer to my question, since it excludes some scenarios where you are worse off for having chosen cryonics even if you are never frozen. Besides, I don’t understand what you mean by “basically zero.” Is it greater than zero?
some scenarios where you are worse off for having chosen cryonics even if you are never frozen.
I don’t think I’ve seen any such scenarios explicitly displayed yet. Here’s one that I think might be plausible:
Assume that cryonics and organ donation continue to be technically incompatible
Assume that organ donation becomes “opt-out” rather than “opt-in” (true in some places now, e.g. Spain)
Assume that opting out for organ donation makes one ineligible to receive a transplant (not true now,
but I’ve heard it proposed) ( new information: something similar is inplace in Israel )
Under this scenario, the loss of eligibility for receiving a transplant would become a liability of cryonics,
even to those cryonicists who are never frozen.
My guess is that the odds of this happening are low, but not exceeding so. Perhaps 1% 10%? (updating odds for similar policy no-give-no-take policy to go into effect in the U.S.)
The scenario I had in mind (which is probably more far-fetched than yours) is that (1) good life extension technology becomes available; and (2) in deciding who should get the benefit of this technology, the powers that be decide to categorically exclude anyone who has ever signed up for cryonics.
It certainly could happen—but mostly cryonics is too small to be on anyone’s radar. If the powers that be decide to categorically exclude a group, it is more likely to be a larger group, and perhaps a group that is more of a direct opponent to the powers. (Also, I think you can omit (1) from your scenario—exclusion from current medical care would do much the same thing, with similar political questions, but without needing to posit a technical advance.)
It certainly could happen—but mostly cryonics is too small to be on anyone’s radar
Possibly, but it’s also possible that cryonics will grow to the point where it hits the radar screen. If a few prominent people sign up it could get a lot of attention.
Anyway, all that’s necessary for the argument is that there is some small chance that you will be worse off for having chosen cryonics just like there is some small chance that you will be worse off for having accepted Jesus.
Under this scenario, the loss of eligibility for receiving a transplant would become a liability of cryonics, even to those cryonicists who are never frozen.
I don’t see how this works. If you want the transplants, you drop the cryonics. If you want the cryonics more, you drop the transplants. You pick whichever option is more valuable for you.
Unless you can’t drop cryonics and sign up for organ donation once you learn you need a transplant, there’s no real loss here, even in this unlikely scenario.
Unless you can’t drop cryonics and sign up for organ donation once you learn you need a transplant, there’s no real loss here, even in this unlikely scenario.
Well presumably under soreff’s scenario, there would be some sort of exclusionary period in place to prevent people from waiting to opt in until just before they need a transplant.
Not really. Pascal’s Wager’s domain is afterlives, about which we know nothing (either because they’re false or because no one can tell us anything). But cryonics has its domain over future possibilities, about which we can know things and so can assign meaningful prior estimates.
While we certainly can think of errant possibilia that make cryonics bad, they are notably errant, requiring us to posit a future incredibly unlike the present, the past and the kinds of changes we see in the world.
I’m not sure that this distinction is important to the argument. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that evidence is discovered which allows one to assign meaningful probabilities to the claim that accepting Jesus will guaranty a trip to heaven for eternity after one’s death. Let’s further suppose that this probability is roughly one in one billion. Would that change anything about the argument? I don’t think so. Pascal’s wager would still have the same basic flaws.
I’m not sure I would put it at “incredibly unlike the present.” After all, there is a lot of hostility to cryonics. And history shows that politics can be pretty chaotic.
Still, you seem to agree that one can make a meaningful estimate of the probability that future public policy will make people worse off for having chosen to sign up for cryonics. So what’s your rough estimate of that probability?
The problem with this is that, once we assign meaningful probabilities to Pascal’s Wager, the conceit succeeds or fails based on those probabilities.
My estimate of a dystopian future in which you’d rather be dead than alive and, yet, somehow you are awakened into that world: basically zero.
I don’t see why that’s a problem. If somehow it were known that there is a 1 in 3 chance that accepting Jesus would lead to an eternity in heaven, then Pascal’s wager would start to make a lot more sense.
That’s not an answer to my question, since it excludes some scenarios where you are worse off for having chosen cryonics even if you are never frozen. Besides, I don’t understand what you mean by “basically zero.” Is it greater than zero?
I don’t think I’ve seen any such scenarios explicitly displayed yet. Here’s one that I think might be plausible:
Assume that cryonics and organ donation continue to be technically incompatible
Assume that organ donation becomes “opt-out” rather than “opt-in” (true in some places now, e.g. Spain)
Assume that opting out for organ donation makes one ineligible to receive a transplant (not true now, but I’ve heard it proposed) ( new information: something similar is in place in Israel )
Under this scenario, the loss of eligibility for receiving a transplant would become a liability of cryonics, even to those cryonicists who are never frozen. My guess is that the odds of this happening are low, but not exceeding so. Perhaps 1% 10%? (updating odds for similar policy no-give-no-take policy to go into effect in the U.S.)
The scenario I had in mind (which is probably more far-fetched than yours) is that (1) good life extension technology becomes available; and (2) in deciding who should get the benefit of this technology, the powers that be decide to categorically exclude anyone who has ever signed up for cryonics.
It certainly could happen—but mostly cryonics is too small to be on anyone’s radar. If the powers that be decide to categorically exclude a group, it is more likely to be a larger group, and perhaps a group that is more of a direct opponent to the powers. (Also, I think you can omit (1) from your scenario—exclusion from current medical care would do much the same thing, with similar political questions, but without needing to posit a technical advance.)
Possibly, but it’s also possible that cryonics will grow to the point where it hits the radar screen. If a few prominent people sign up it could get a lot of attention.
Anyway, all that’s necessary for the argument is that there is some small chance that you will be worse off for having chosen cryonics just like there is some small chance that you will be worse off for having accepted Jesus.
I don’t see how this works. If you want the transplants, you drop the cryonics. If you want the cryonics more, you drop the transplants. You pick whichever option is more valuable for you.
Unless you can’t drop cryonics and sign up for organ donation once you learn you need a transplant, there’s no real loss here, even in this unlikely scenario.
Well presumably under soreff’s scenario, there would be some sort of exclusionary period in place to prevent people from waiting to opt in until just before they need a transplant.