The whole argument isn’t about decidability at all, whether internal or external. And if you consider the existence of subjective experience to be neither true nor false in some cases, you fail Point 1.
Point 1 accepts the possibility that consciousness may not be binary, but could instead have degrees. Point 2 fudges this. Point 3 then assumes that it’s binary.
Thanks, you have found a mistake in the post. But it seems minor to me because the whole reasoning from Point 2 on can be applied to a specific degree of consciousness, e.g. the waterline of neurologically intact humans.
The whole argument isn’t about decidability at all, whether internal or external. And if you consider the existence of subjective experience to be neither true nor false in some cases, you fail Point 1.
Point 1 accepts the possibility that consciousness may not be binary, but could instead have degrees. Point 2 fudges this. Point 3 then assumes that it’s binary.
Thanks, you have found a mistake in the post. But it seems minor to me because the whole reasoning from Point 2 on can be applied to a specific degree of consciousness, e.g. the waterline of neurologically intact humans.