Rationality principle, learned from strategy board games:
In some games there are special privileged actions you can take just once or twice per game. These actions are usually quite powerful, which is why they are restricted. For example, in Tigris and Euphrates, there is a special action that allows you to permanently destroy a position.
So the principle is: if you get to the end of the game and find you have some of these “power actions” left over, you know (retrospectively) that you were too conservative about using them. This is true even if you won; perhaps if you had used the power actions you would have won sooner.
Generalizing to real life, if you get to the end of some project or challenge, and still have some “power actions” left over, you were too conservative, even if the project went well and/or you succeeded at the challenge.
What are real life power actions? Well, there are a lot of different interpretations, but one is using social capital. You can’t ask your rich grand-uncle to fund your startup every six months, but can probably do it once or twice in your life. And even if you think you can succeed without asking, you still might want to do it, because there’s not much point in “conserving” this kind of power action.
This isn’t true in all games, and doesn’t generalize to life. There are lots of “power moves” that just don’t apply to all situations, and if you don’t find yourself in a situation where it helps, you shouldn’t use them just because they’re limited.
It doesn’t even generalize completely to those games where a power move is always helpful (but varies in how helpful it is). It’s perfectly reasonable to wait for a better option, and then be surprised when a better option doesn’t occur before the game ends,
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem - the optimal strategy for determining the best candidate for a one-use decision ends up with the last random-valued option 1/e of the time. (edit:actually, it only FINDS the best option 1/e of the time. close to 2/3 of the time it fails.)
Another example is the question: “When have you failed the last time?” Because when you don’t fail you are not advancing as fast as you could (and don’t learn as much).
On the other hand: Running of full energy may drain your power over the long run.
This seems like one of the less credible Umeshisms.
Suppose that at the margin you can get to the airport one minute later on average at the cost of a probability p of missing your plane. Then you should do this if U(one minute at home instead of at airport) > -p U(missing plane). That’s not obviously the case. Is it?
The argument might be that if you never miss a plane then your current plane-missing probability is zero, and therefore you’re in the “safe” region, and it’s very unlikely that you’re right on the boundary of the safe region, so you can afford to move a little in the unsafe direction. But this is rubbish; all that “I never miss a plane” tells you is a rough upper bound on how likely you are to miss a plane, and if you don’t fly an awful lot this might be a very crude upper bound; and depending on those U() values even a rather small extra chance of missing the plane might be (anti-)worth a lot more to you than a few extra minutes spent at home.
(A couple of other fiddly details, both of which also argue against arriving later at the airport. First, you may be happier when you leave more margin because you are less worried about the consequences of missing your plane. Second, even when you don’t actually miss your plane you may sometimes have to endure lesser unpleasantnesses like having to run to avoid missing it.)
What about “power actions” in board games? Here I mostly agree with Daniel, but with a proviso: If there is uncertainty about when the game is going to end, then on any given occasion you may find that it ends before you use a “power action” but that you were still right (in the sense of “executing a good strategy” rather than “doing things that turn out in hindsight to be optimal”) not to use it earlier. Because maybe there was an 80% chance that the game would go on longer and you’d have a more effective time to use it later, and only a 20% chance that it would end this soon.
On the real-life application, I think Daniel is probably right that many people are too conservative about spending social capital.
Rationality principle, learned from strategy board games:
In some games there are special privileged actions you can take just once or twice per game. These actions are usually quite powerful, which is why they are restricted. For example, in Tigris and Euphrates, there is a special action that allows you to permanently destroy a position.
So the principle is: if you get to the end of the game and find you have some of these “power actions” left over, you know (retrospectively) that you were too conservative about using them. This is true even if you won; perhaps if you had used the power actions you would have won sooner.
Generalizing to real life, if you get to the end of some project or challenge, and still have some “power actions” left over, you were too conservative, even if the project went well and/or you succeeded at the challenge.
What are real life power actions? Well, there are a lot of different interpretations, but one is using social capital. You can’t ask your rich grand-uncle to fund your startup every six months, but can probably do it once or twice in your life. And even if you think you can succeed without asking, you still might want to do it, because there’s not much point in “conserving” this kind of power action.
This isn’t true in all games, and doesn’t generalize to life. There are lots of “power moves” that just don’t apply to all situations, and if you don’t find yourself in a situation where it helps, you shouldn’t use them just because they’re limited.
It doesn’t even generalize completely to those games where a power move is always helpful (but varies in how helpful it is). It’s perfectly reasonable to wait for a better option, and then be surprised when a better option doesn’t occur before the game ends,
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem - the optimal strategy for determining the best candidate for a one-use decision ends up with the last random-valued option 1/e of the time. (edit:actually, it only FINDS the best option 1/e of the time. close to 2/3 of the time it fails.)
Another example is the question: “When have you failed the last time?” Because when you don’t fail you are not advancing as fast as you could (and don’t learn as much).
On the other hand: Running of full energy may drain your power over the long run.
Relationships also get build by asking for favor and by giving favors. Social capital isn’t necessarily used up by asking for favors.
Sure. If you never miss a plane then you are getting to the airport too early.
This seems like one of the less credible Umeshisms.
Suppose that at the margin you can get to the airport one minute later on average at the cost of a probability p of missing your plane. Then you should do this if U(one minute at home instead of at airport) > -p U(missing plane). That’s not obviously the case. Is it?
The argument might be that if you never miss a plane then your current plane-missing probability is zero, and therefore you’re in the “safe” region, and it’s very unlikely that you’re right on the boundary of the safe region, so you can afford to move a little in the unsafe direction. But this is rubbish; all that “I never miss a plane” tells you is a rough upper bound on how likely you are to miss a plane, and if you don’t fly an awful lot this might be a very crude upper bound; and depending on those U() values even a rather small extra chance of missing the plane might be (anti-)worth a lot more to you than a few extra minutes spent at home.
(A couple of other fiddly details, both of which also argue against arriving later at the airport. First, you may be happier when you leave more margin because you are less worried about the consequences of missing your plane. Second, even when you don’t actually miss your plane you may sometimes have to endure lesser unpleasantnesses like having to run to avoid missing it.)
What about “power actions” in board games? Here I mostly agree with Daniel, but with a proviso: If there is uncertainty about when the game is going to end, then on any given occasion you may find that it ends before you use a “power action” but that you were still right (in the sense of “executing a good strategy” rather than “doing things that turn out in hindsight to be optimal”) not to use it earlier. Because maybe there was an 80% chance that the game would go on longer and you’d have a more effective time to use it later, and only a 20% chance that it would end this soon.
On the real-life application, I think Daniel is probably right that many people are too conservative about spending social capital.