It sounds like you think there’s no practical way to introduce exceptions to make an LVT politically palatable without also breaking its ability to motivate efficient land use and generate tax revenue.
My first thought is sure, we have a lot of tax evasion now. But we also do generate lots of tax revenue, most tax revenue comes from the very rich. Why would an LVT be so much more prone to tax evasion than the current system?
Correct, I think there’s no practical or realpolitik-theoretical way to make it work. To the extent that you make exceptions in implementation, it’s no longer a land-value tax, it’s a land-value fig leaf over a “what we can get away with” tax.
to the extent that you make exceptions in implementation, it’s no longer a land-value tax
This is true the same way that to the extent you dilute your cocoa with water, it’s no longer hot chocolate, it’s water :) I don’t know of almost any “pure” real world policies or taxes. I’d need some good evidence to believe that the LVT is that fragile.
It sounds like you think there’s no practical way to introduce exceptions to make an LVT politically palatable without also breaking its ability to motivate efficient land use and generate tax revenue.
My first thought is sure, we have a lot of tax evasion now. But we also do generate lots of tax revenue, most tax revenue comes from the very rich. Why would an LVT be so much more prone to tax evasion than the current system?
Correct, I think there’s no practical or realpolitik-theoretical way to make it work. To the extent that you make exceptions in implementation, it’s no longer a land-value tax, it’s a land-value fig leaf over a “what we can get away with” tax.
This is true the same way that to the extent you dilute your cocoa with water, it’s no longer hot chocolate, it’s water :) I don’t know of almost any “pure” real world policies or taxes. I’d need some good evidence to believe that the LVT is that fragile.