The correspondence theory of truth is mainly a claim about what truth means....not about what you should use. There are various arguments to the effect that you can’t confirm correspondence,but that doesn’t directly affect the semantic argument. The inaccessibility of correspondence would mean there is no justification for correspondence truth, but truth can exist without justification.
Pragmatism, similarly, is the claim that truth is… means...usefulness. It’s not a claim about reality.
Ultimately, it seems to me the only clear criterion the correspondence theorist can establish for correlating the model with the world is actual empirical success.
Again, the correspondence theorist could have reasons to think that truth is correspondence, whilst still using success as a justificational criterion.
But I don’t think this maneuver can save the correspondence theory. The correspondence theory bases truth on a representational relationship between models/beliefs and the world. A model is true if it accurately represents its domain. Representation is a normative relationship. Causation is not
Causation can be. A causal relation isn’t necessarily normative, for some version of normativity, but it could be...but it takes extra information to determine that it is. This can easily be seen from computing: computers can perform normatively correct computations, but can have bugs.
The correspondence theory of truth is mainly a claim about what truth means....not about what you should use. There are various arguments to the effect that you can’t confirm correspondence,but that doesn’t directly affect the semantic argument. The inaccessibility of correspondence would mean there is no justification for correspondence truth, but truth can exist without justification.
Pragmatism, similarly, is the claim that truth is… means...usefulness. It’s not a claim about reality.
Again, the correspondence theorist could have reasons to think that truth is correspondence, whilst still using success as a justificational criterion.
Causation can be. A causal relation isn’t necessarily normative, for some version of normativity, but it could be...but it takes extra information to determine that it is. This can easily be seen from computing: computers can perform normatively correct computations, but can have bugs.