How much do you know about many worlds, anyways?
My alternate self very much does exist, the technical term is possibility-cloud which will eventually diverge noticeably but which for now is just barely distinguishable from me.
Vladimir_Nesov!2009 knew more than enough about Many Worlds to know how to exclude it as a consideration. Vladimir_Nesov!2013 probably hasn’t forgotten.
My alternate self very much does exist, the technical term is possibility-cloud which will eventually diverge noticeably but which for now is just barely distinguishable from me.
No. It doesn’t exist. Not all uncertainty represents knowledge about quantum events which will have significant macroscopic relevance. Some represents mere ignorance. This ignorance can be about events that are close to deterministic—that means the ‘alternate selves’ have negligible measure and even less decision theoretic relevance. Other uncertainty represents logical uncertainty. That is, where the alternate selves don’t even exist in the trivial irrelevant sense. It was just that the participant didn’t know that “2+2=4” yet.
Given that many-worlds is true, yes. Invoking it kind of defeats the purpose of the decision theory problem though, as it is meant as a test of reflective consistency (i.e. you are supposed to assume you prefer $100>$0 in this world regardless of any other worlds).
How much do you know about many worlds, anyways? My alternate self very much does exist, the technical term is possibility-cloud which will eventually diverge noticeably but which for now is just barely distinguishable from me.
there you go.
Vladimir_Nesov!2009 knew more than enough about Many Worlds to know how to exclude it as a consideration. Vladimir_Nesov!2013 probably hasn’t forgotten.
No. It doesn’t exist. Not all uncertainty represents knowledge about quantum events which will have significant macroscopic relevance. Some represents mere ignorance. This ignorance can be about events that are close to deterministic—that means the ‘alternate selves’ have negligible measure and even less decision theoretic relevance. Other uncertainty represents logical uncertainty. That is, where the alternate selves don’t even exist in the trivial irrelevant sense. It was just that the participant didn’t know that “2+2=4” yet.
There may be fewer of those than you realize.
Given that many-worlds is true, yes. Invoking it kind of defeats the purpose of the decision theory problem though, as it is meant as a test of reflective consistency (i.e. you are supposed to assume you prefer $100>$0 in this world regardless of any other worlds).