Note that the CEV must necessarily address contradicting terminal values. Thus an FAI is assumed to be powerful enough to affect people’s terminal values, at least over time.
For example, (some of the) Nazis might be OK with not wanting Jews dead, they are just unable to change their innate Jewphobia. An analogy would be people who are afraid of snakes but would not mind living in a world where snakes are non-poisonous (and not dangerous in any other way) and they are not afraid of them.
Note that the CEV must necessarily address contradicting terminal values. Thus an FAI is assumed to be powerful enough to affect people’s terminal values, at least over time.
For example, (some of the) Nazis might be OK with not wanting Jews dead, they are just unable to change their innate Jewphobia. An analogy would be people who are afraid of snakes but would not mind living in a world where snakes are non-poisonous (and not dangerous in any other way) and they are not afraid of them.