It’s worse to break the two legs of a single man than to break one leg each of seven billion people?
First, I would eliminate two leg breaking. Second, one leg breaking.
Of course, an epidemic one leg breaking would have othere severe effects like starvation to death and alike. What should come even before two broken legs.
In a clean abstract world of just a broken leg or two per person, with no further implications, the maximal pain is stil the first to be eliminated, if you ask me.
From behind the veil of ignorance, would you rather have a 100% chance of one broken leg, or a 1⁄7,000,000,000 chance of two broken legs and 6,999,999,999⁄7,000,000,000 chance of being unharmed?
But I would choose one broken leg, if that would mean that the total amount of two broken legs would go to zero then.
Creatures somewhere in existence are going to face death and severe harm for the foreseeable future. This view then seems inert.
In another words. I would vaccinate everybody (the vaccination causes discomfort) to eliminate a deadly disease like Ebola which kills few.
What would you do?
There are enough minor threats with expensive countermeasures (more expensive as higher reliability is demanded) that this approach would devour all available wealth. It would bar us from, e.g. traveling for entertainment (risk of death exists whether we walk, drive, or fly). I wouldn’t want that tradeoff for society or for myself.
I would endorse choosing a broken leg for one person if that guaranteed that nobody in the world had two broken legs, certainly. This seems to have drifted rather far from the original problem statement.
I would also vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a few hundred deaths/year, if the vaccination caused no negative consequences beyond mild discomfort (e.g., no chance of a fatal allergic reaction to the vaccine, no chance of someone starving to death for lack of the resources that went towards vaccination, etc).
I’m not sure I would vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a dozen deaths though… maybe, maybe not. I suspect it depends on how much I value the people involved.
I probably wouldn’t vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a .000001 chance of someone dying. Though if I assume that people normally live a few million years instead of a few dozen, I might change my mind. I’m not sure though… it’s hard to estimate with real numbers in such an implausible scenario; my intuitions about real scenarios (with opportunity costs, knock-on effects, etc.) keep interfering.
Which doesn’t change my belief that scale matters. Breaking one person’s leg is preferable to breaking two people’s legs. Breaking both of one person’s legs is preferable to breaking one of a million people’s legs.
In another words. I would vaccinate everybody (the vaccination causes discomfort) to eliminate a deadly disease like Ebola which kills few.
What would you do?
I don’t think you understand the logic behind the anti-speckers’s choice. It isn’t that we always oppose the greater number of minor disutilities. It’s that we believe that there’s an actual judgment to be made given the specific disutilities and numbers involved—you on the other hand just ignore the numbers involved altogether.
I would vaccinate everyone to eradicate Ebola which kills few. But I would not vaccinate everyone to eradicate a different disease that mildly discomforts few only slightly more so than the vaccination process itself.
Agreed that introducing knock-on effects (starvation and so forth) is significantly changing the scenario. I endorse ignoring that.
Given seven billion one-legged people and one zero-legged person, and the ability to wave a magic wand and cure either the zero-legged person or the 6,999,999,999 one-legged people, I heal the one-legged people.
That’s true even if I have the two broken legs. That’s true even if I will get to heal the other set later (as is implied by your use of the word “first”).
If I’ve understood you correctly, you commit to using the wand to healing my legs instead of healing everyone else.
If that’s true, I will do my best to keep that wand out of your hands.
I would devote an amount of energy to avoiding that scenario that seemed commensurate with its expected value. Indeed, I’m doing so right now (EDIT: actually, on consideration, I’m devoting far more energy to it than it merits). If my estimate of the likelihood of you obtaining such a wand (and, presumably, finding the one person in the world who is suffering incrementally more than anyone else and alleviating his or her suffering with it) increases, the amount of energy I devote to avoiding it might also increase.
First, I would eliminate two leg breaking. Second, one leg breaking.
Of course, an epidemic one leg breaking would have othere severe effects like starvation to death and alike. What should come even before two broken legs.
In a clean abstract world of just a broken leg or two per person, with no further implications, the maximal pain is stil the first to be eliminated, if you ask me.
From behind the veil of ignorance, would you rather have a 100% chance of one broken leg, or a 1⁄7,000,000,000 chance of two broken legs and 6,999,999,999⁄7,000,000,000 chance of being unharmed?
I would opt for two broken legs with a small probability, of course. In your scenario.
But I would choose one broken leg, if that would mean that the total amount of two broken legs would go to zero then.
In another words. I would vaccinate everybody (the vaccination causes discomfort) to eliminate a deadly disease like Ebola which kills few.
What would you do?
Creatures somewhere in existence are going to face death and severe harm for the foreseeable future. This view then seems inert.
There are enough minor threats with expensive countermeasures (more expensive as higher reliability is demanded) that this approach would devour all available wealth. It would bar us from, e.g. traveling for entertainment (risk of death exists whether we walk, drive, or fly). I wouldn’t want that tradeoff for society or for myself.
I would endorse choosing a broken leg for one person if that guaranteed that nobody in the world had two broken legs, certainly. This seems to have drifted rather far from the original problem statement.
I would also vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a few hundred deaths/year, if the vaccination caused no negative consequences beyond mild discomfort (e.g., no chance of a fatal allergic reaction to the vaccine, no chance of someone starving to death for lack of the resources that went towards vaccination, etc).
I’m not sure I would vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a dozen deaths though… maybe, maybe not. I suspect it depends on how much I value the people involved.
I probably wouldn’t vaccinate a few billion people to avoid a .000001 chance of someone dying. Though if I assume that people normally live a few million years instead of a few dozen, I might change my mind. I’m not sure though… it’s hard to estimate with real numbers in such an implausible scenario; my intuitions about real scenarios (with opportunity costs, knock-on effects, etc.) keep interfering.
Which doesn’t change my belief that scale matters. Breaking one person’s leg is preferable to breaking two people’s legs. Breaking both of one person’s legs is preferable to breaking one of a million people’s legs.
I don’t think you understand the logic behind the anti-speckers’s choice. It isn’t that we always oppose the greater number of minor disutilities. It’s that we believe that there’s an actual judgment to be made given the specific disutilities and numbers involved—you on the other hand just ignore the numbers involved altogether.
I would vaccinate everyone to eradicate Ebola which kills few. But I would not vaccinate everyone to eradicate a different disease that mildly discomforts few only slightly more so than the vaccination process itself.
The logic is: Integrate two evils through time and eliminate that which has a bigger integral!
I just don’t agree with it.
May I ask if you consider yourself a deontologist, a consequentialist, or something else?
Agreed that introducing knock-on effects (starvation and so forth) is significantly changing the scenario. I endorse ignoring that.
Given seven billion one-legged people and one zero-legged person, and the ability to wave a magic wand and cure either the zero-legged person or the 6,999,999,999 one-legged people, I heal the one-legged people.
That’s true even if I have the two broken legs.
That’s true even if I will get to heal the other set later (as is implied by your use of the word “first”).
If I’ve understood you correctly, you commit to using the wand to healing my legs instead of healing everyone else.
If that’s true, I will do my best to keep that wand out of your hands.
So, you would do everything you can, to prevent a small probability, but very bad scenario? Wouldn’t you just neglect it?
I would devote an amount of energy to avoiding that scenario that seemed commensurate with its expected value. Indeed, I’m doing so right now (EDIT: actually, on consideration, I’m devoting far more energy to it than it merits). If my estimate of the likelihood of you obtaining such a wand (and, presumably, finding the one person in the world who is suffering incrementally more than anyone else and alleviating his or her suffering with it) increases, the amount of energy I devote to avoiding it might also increase.