It would probably least-destructively turn the jews into nazis or vice versa; e.g. alter one or the other’s terminal values such that they were fully compatible. After all, if the only difference between jews and nazis is the nose, why not ask the jews to change the nose and gain an anti-former-nose preference (theoretically the jews would gain utility because they’d have a new terminal value they could satisfy). Of course this is a fine example of how meaningless terminal values can survive despite their innate meaningless; the nazis should realize the irrationality of their terminal value and simply drop it. But will CEV force them to drop it? Probably not. The practical effect is the dissolution of practical utility; utility earned from satisfying an anti-jew preference necessarily reduces the amount of utility attainable from other possible terminal values. That should be a strong argument CEV has to convince any group that one of their terminal values can be dropped, by comparing the opportunity cost of satisfying it to the benefit of satisfying other terminal values. This is even more of a digression from the original question, but I think this implies that CEV may eventually settle on a single, maximally effective terminal value.
It would probably least-destructively turn the jews into nazis or vice versa; e.g. alter one or the other’s terminal values such that they were fully compatible. After all, if the only difference between jews and nazis is the nose, why not ask the jews to change the nose and gain an anti-former-nose preference (theoretically the jews would gain utility because they’d have a new terminal value they could satisfy). Of course this is a fine example of how meaningless terminal values can survive despite their innate meaningless; the nazis should realize the irrationality of their terminal value and simply drop it. But will CEV force them to drop it? Probably not. The practical effect is the dissolution of practical utility; utility earned from satisfying an anti-jew preference necessarily reduces the amount of utility attainable from other possible terminal values. That should be a strong argument CEV has to convince any group that one of their terminal values can be dropped, by comparing the opportunity cost of satisfying it to the benefit of satisfying other terminal values. This is even more of a digression from the original question, but I think this implies that CEV may eventually settle on a single, maximally effective terminal value.