I’m not sure how one could show such a thing in a way that can plausibly be applied to the Vast scale differences posited in the DSvT thought experiment.
When I try to come up with real-world examples of lexicographic preferences, it’s pretty clear to me that I’m rounding… that is, X is so much more important than Y that I can in effect neglect Y in any decision that involves a difference in X, no matter how much Y there is relative to X, for any values of X and Y worth considering.
But if someone seriously invites me to consider ludicrous values of Y (e.g., 3^^^3 dust specks), that strategy is no longer useful.
I’m quite sure I’m not rounding when I prefer hearing a Wagner opera to hearing any number of folk dance tunes, and when I prefer reading a Vernor Vinge novel to hearing any number of Wagner operas. See also this comment for another example.
It seems, lexicographic preferences arise when one has a choice between qualitatively different experiences. In such cases, any differences in quantity, however vast, are just irrelevant. An experience of long unbearable torture cannot be quantified in terms of minor discomforts.
It seems our introspective accounts of our mental processes are qualitatively different, then.
I’m willing to take your word for it that your experience of long unbearable torture cannot be “quantified” in terms of minor discomforts. If you wish to argue that mine can’t either, I’m willing to listen.
I’m not sure how one could show such a thing in a way that can plausibly be applied to the Vast scale differences posited in the DSvT thought experiment.
When I try to come up with real-world examples of lexicographic preferences, it’s pretty clear to me that I’m rounding… that is, X is so much more important than Y that I can in effect neglect Y in any decision that involves a difference in X, no matter how much Y there is relative to X, for any values of X and Y worth considering.
But if someone seriously invites me to consider ludicrous values of Y (e.g., 3^^^3 dust specks), that strategy is no longer useful.
I’m quite sure I’m not rounding when I prefer hearing a Wagner opera to hearing any number of folk dance tunes, and when I prefer reading a Vernor Vinge novel to hearing any number of Wagner operas. See also this comment for another example.
It seems, lexicographic preferences arise when one has a choice between qualitatively different experiences. In such cases, any differences in quantity, however vast, are just irrelevant. An experience of long unbearable torture cannot be quantified in terms of minor discomforts.
It seems our introspective accounts of our mental processes are qualitatively different, then.
I’m willing to take your word for it that your experience of long unbearable torture cannot be “quantified” in terms of minor discomforts. If you wish to argue that mine can’t either, I’m willing to listen.