I think part of what made me stray from “the path” was a tendency to root for the rhetorical “underdog”...
Oh, don’t get me wrong, I enjoy arguing for the other side too, provided it’s disclaimed afterward. It’s a good way to see your rationalization machine shift into high gear. There is always a combination of lies, omissions, half-truths, special pleading and personal anecdotes that can convince at least a few people that you’re right—or, MUCH better, that your position should be respected.
But… rationality is usually the rhetorical underdog. Tssk! :P
...and be intrigued—excessively—with brilliant arguments that could defend ridiculous positions. I think I can turn that around here.
Want a brilliant argument defending a silly position? Try Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. To ascend such lofty heights of obfuscation, bring lots of pressurized oxygen.
To wit:
-Evolution optimizes for survival value, not truth value in beliefs
-Beliefs are therefore adaptive but not necessarily true (you could, conceivably, believe that you should run away from a tiger because tigers like friendly footraces).
-Therefore, on naturalism, we should expect the reliability of our cognition to be low
-This means we should, if we accept naturalism, also accept that our cognitive apparatus is too flawed to have good reasons to accept naturalism. QED, atheist.
Oh, don’t get me wrong, I enjoy arguing for the other side too, provided it’s disclaimed afterward. It’s a good way to see your rationalization machine shift into high gear. There is always a combination of lies, omissions, half-truths, special pleading and personal anecdotes that can convince at least a few people that you’re right—or, MUCH better, that your position should be respected.
But… rationality is usually the rhetorical underdog. Tssk! :P
Want a brilliant argument defending a silly position? Try Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. To ascend such lofty heights of obfuscation, bring lots of pressurized oxygen.
To wit:
-Evolution optimizes for survival value, not truth value in beliefs
-Beliefs are therefore adaptive but not necessarily true (you could, conceivably, believe that you should run away from a tiger because tigers like friendly footraces).
-Therefore, on naturalism, we should expect the reliability of our cognition to be low
-This means we should, if we accept naturalism, also accept that our cognitive apparatus is too flawed to have good reasons to accept naturalism. QED, atheist.