EDIT: the purpose of this post is simply to show that there is a difference between certain reasoning for already existing and potential people. I don’t argue that aggregation is the only difference, nor (in this post) that total utilitarianism for potential people is wrong. Simply that the case for existing people is stronger than for potential people.
Consider the following choices:
You must choose between torturing someone for 50 years, or torturing 3^^^3 people for a millisecond each (yes, it’s a more symmetric variant on the dust-specks vs torture problem).
You must choose between creating someone who will be tortured for 50 years, or creating 3^^^3 people who will each get tortured for a millisecond each.
Some people might feel that these two choices are the same. There are some key differences between them, however—and not only because the second choice seems more underspecified than the first. The difference is the effect of aggregation—of facing the same choice again and again and again. And again...
There are roughly 1.6 billion seconds in 50 years (hence 1.6 trillion milliseconds in 50 years). Assume a fixed population of 3^^^3 people, and assume that you were going to face the first choice 1.6 trillion times (in each case, the person to be tortured is assigned randomly and independently). Then choosing “50 years” each time results in 1.6 trillion people getting tortured for 50 years (the chance of the same person being chosen to be tortured twice is of the order of 50/3^^^3 - closer to zero than most people can imagine). Choosing “a millisecond” each time results in 3^^^3 people, each getting tortured for (slightly more than) 50 years.
The choice there is clear: pick “50 years”. Now, you could argue that your decision should change based on how often you (or people like you) expects to face the same choice, and assumes a fixed population of size 3^^^3, but there is a strong intuitive case to be made that the 50 years of torture is the way to go.
Compare with the second choice now. Choosing “50 years” 1.6 trillion times results in the creation of 1.6 trillion people who get tortured for 50 years. The “a millisecond” choice results in 1.6 trillion times 3^^^3 people being created, each tortured for a millisecond. Conditional on what the rest of the life of these people is like, many people (including me) would feel the “a millisecond” option is much better.
As far as I can tell (please do post suggestions), there is no way of aggregating impacts on potential people you are creating, in the same way that you can aggregate impacts on existing people (of course, you can first create potential people, then add impacts to them—or add impacts that will affect them when they get created—but this isn’t the same thing). Thus the two situations seem justifiably different, and there is no strong reason to assign the intuitions of the first case to the second.
Potential vs already existent people and aggregation
EDIT: the purpose of this post is simply to show that there is a difference between certain reasoning for already existing and potential people. I don’t argue that aggregation is the only difference, nor (in this post) that total utilitarianism for potential people is wrong. Simply that the case for existing people is stronger than for potential people.
Consider the following choices:
You must choose between torturing someone for 50 years, or torturing 3^^^3 people for a millisecond each (yes, it’s a more symmetric variant on the dust-specks vs torture problem).
You must choose between creating someone who will be tortured for 50 years, or creating 3^^^3 people who will each get tortured for a millisecond each.
Some people might feel that these two choices are the same. There are some key differences between them, however—and not only because the second choice seems more underspecified than the first. The difference is the effect of aggregation—of facing the same choice again and again and again. And again...
There are roughly 1.6 billion seconds in 50 years (hence 1.6 trillion milliseconds in 50 years). Assume a fixed population of 3^^^3 people, and assume that you were going to face the first choice 1.6 trillion times (in each case, the person to be tortured is assigned randomly and independently). Then choosing “50 years” each time results in 1.6 trillion people getting tortured for 50 years (the chance of the same person being chosen to be tortured twice is of the order of 50/3^^^3 - closer to zero than most people can imagine). Choosing “a millisecond” each time results in 3^^^3 people, each getting tortured for (slightly more than) 50 years.
The choice there is clear: pick “50 years”. Now, you could argue that your decision should change based on how often you (or people like you) expects to face the same choice, and assumes a fixed population of size 3^^^3, but there is a strong intuitive case to be made that the 50 years of torture is the way to go.
Compare with the second choice now. Choosing “50 years” 1.6 trillion times results in the creation of 1.6 trillion people who get tortured for 50 years. The “a millisecond” choice results in 1.6 trillion times 3^^^3 people being created, each tortured for a millisecond. Conditional on what the rest of the life of these people is like, many people (including me) would feel the “a millisecond” option is much better.
As far as I can tell (please do post suggestions), there is no way of aggregating impacts on potential people you are creating, in the same way that you can aggregate impacts on existing people (of course, you can first create potential people, then add impacts to them—or add impacts that will affect them when they get created—but this isn’t the same thing). Thus the two situations seem justifiably different, and there is no strong reason to assign the intuitions of the first case to the second.