There should be a limit to utility based on the pattern theory of identity, a finite number of sentient patterns, and identical patterns counting as one.
I phrased this as confidently as I did in the hopes it would provoke downvotes with attached explanations of why it is wrong. I am surprised to see it without downvotes and granting that even more surprised to see it without upvotes.
In truth I am not so certain of some of the above, and would appreciate comments. I’m asking nicely this time! Is identity about being in a pattern? Is there a limit to the number of sentient patterns? Do identical patterns count as one for moral purposes?
Finally: is it truly impossible to infinitely care about a finite thing?
Finally: is it truly impossible to infinitely care about a finite thing?
In a finite universe, I’d say it’s impossible, at least from a functional standpoint and assuming an agent with a utility function. The agent can prefer a world where every other bit of matter and energy other than the cared-about thing is in its maximally dis-preferred configuration and the cared-about thing is in a minimally satisfactory configuration to a world where every other bit of matter and energy is in its maximally preferred configuration and the cared-about thing is in a nearly-but-not-quite minimally satisfactory configuration, but that’s still a finite degree of difference. (It’s a bit similar to how it’s impossible to have ‘infinite money’ in practice, because once you own all the things, money is pointless.)
Finally: is it truly impossible to infinitely care about a finite thing?
Yes. Or, equivalently, you can care about it to degree 1 and care about everything else 0. Either way the question isn’t a deep philosophical one, it’s just what the implication of certain types of trivial utility function represent.
There should be a limit to utility based on the pattern theory of identity, a finite number of sentient patterns, and identical patterns counting as one.
I phrased this as confidently as I did in the hopes it would provoke downvotes with attached explanations of why it is wrong. I am surprised to see it without downvotes and granting that even more surprised to see it without upvotes.
In truth I am not so certain of some of the above, and would appreciate comments. I’m asking nicely this time! Is identity about being in a pattern? Is there a limit to the number of sentient patterns? Do identical patterns count as one for moral purposes?
Finally: is it truly impossible to infinitely care about a finite thing?
In a finite universe, I’d say it’s impossible, at least from a functional standpoint and assuming an agent with a utility function. The agent can prefer a world where every other bit of matter and energy other than the cared-about thing is in its maximally dis-preferred configuration and the cared-about thing is in a minimally satisfactory configuration to a world where every other bit of matter and energy is in its maximally preferred configuration and the cared-about thing is in a nearly-but-not-quite minimally satisfactory configuration, but that’s still a finite degree of difference. (It’s a bit similar to how it’s impossible to have ‘infinite money’ in practice, because once you own all the things, money is pointless.)
Yes. Or, equivalently, you can care about it to degree 1 and care about everything else 0. Either way the question isn’t a deep philosophical one, it’s just what the implication of certain types of trivial utility function represent.