But at least, running it is uncontroversial by definition.
I’m very dubious of CEV as a model for Friendly AI. I think it’s a bad idea for several reasons. So, not that either.
Also, on topic, recall that, when you extrapolate the volition of crazy people, their volition is not, in particular, more sane. It is more as they would like to be. If you see lizard people, you don’t want to see lizard people less. You want sharpened senses to detect them better. Likewise, if you extrapolate a serial killer, you don’t get Ghandi. You get an incredibly good serial killer.
I’m very dubious of CEV as a model for Friendly AI. I think it’s a bad idea for several reasons. So, not that either.
I don’t see how this is possible. One can be dubious about whether it can be defined in the way it is stated, or whether it can be implemented. But assuming it can, why would it be controversial to fulfill the wish(es) of literally everyone, while affecting everything else the least?
when you extrapolate the volition of crazy people, their volition is not, in particular, more sane
Extrapolating volition includes correcting wrong knowledge and increasing intelligence. So, you do stop seeing lizard people if they don’t exist.
Serial killers are more interesting example. But they too don’t want everyone to die. Assuming serial killers get full knowledge of their condition and sufficient intelligence for understanding it, what would their volition actually be? I don’t know, but I’m sure it’s not universal death.
But assuming it can, why would it be controversial to fulfill the wish(es) of literally everyone, while affecting everything else the least?
Problems:
Extrapolation is poorly defined, and, to me, seems to go in either one of two directions: either you make people more as they would like to be, which throws any ideas of coherence out the window, or you make people ‘better’ a long a specific axis, in which case you’re no longer directing the question back at humanity in a meaningful sense. Even something as simple as removing wrong beliefs (as you imply) would automatically erase any but the very weakest theological notions. There are a lot of people in the world who would die to stop that from happening. So, yes, controversial.
Coherence, one way or another, is unlikely to exist. Humans want a bunch of different things. Smarter, better-informed humans would still want a bunch of different, conflicting things. Trying to satisfy all of them won’t work. Trying to satisfy the majority at the expense of the minorities might get incredibly ugly incredibly fast. I don’t have a better solution at this time, but I don’t think taking some kind of vote over the sum total of humanity is going to produce any kind of coherent plan of action.
Trying to satisfy the majority at the expense of the minorities might get incredibly ugly incredibly fast.
But would that be actually uglier than the status quo? Right now, to a very good approximation, those who were born from the right vagina are satisfied at the expense of those born from the wrong vagina. Is that any better?
I call the Litany of Gendlin on the idea that everyone can’t be fully satisfied at once. And I also call the Fallacy of Gray on the idea that if you can’t do something perfectly, then doing it decently is no better than not doing it at all.
But would that be actually uglier than the status quo?
I don’t know. It conceivably could be, and there would be no possibility of improving it, ever. I’m just saying it might be wise to have a better model before we commit to something for eternity.
For extrapolation to be conceptually plausible, I imagine “knowledge” and “intelligence level” to be independent variables of a mind, knobs to turn. To be sure, this picture looks ridiculous. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that this picture is realizable, extrapolation appears to be definable.
Yes, many religious people wouldn’t want their beliefs erased, but only because they believe them to be true. They wouldn’t oppose increasing their knowledge if they knew it was true knowledge. Cases of belief in belief would be dissolved if it was known that true beliefs were better in all respects, including individual happiness.
Coherence, one way or another, is unlikely to exist. Humans want a bunch of different things...
Yes, I agree with this. But, I believe there exist wishes universal for (extrapolated) humans, among which I think there is the wish for humans to continue existing. I would like for AI to fulfil this wish (and other universal wishes if there are any), while letting people decide everything else for themselves.
AFAIK, CEV is not well-defined or fully specified, except as a declaration of intent, a research direction. Thus, it does not make sense to say whether CEV as a model for FAI does or does not in fact do specific things. It only makes sense to say whether the intention of CEV’s developers for it to do or not do those things, and whether CEV’s specification so far contradicts or does not contradict those things.
AFAIU, CEV’s developers’ intent and CEV’s specification so far (with added “unanimousity” condition, if it is not present in the standard CEV specification) do not contradict my statement.
Just to make sure I understand your claim: you’re asserting that we can identify some set of people in the world right now who are “CEV’s developers,” and if we asked them “does CEV fulfill the wish(es) of literally everyone while affecting everything else the least?” they would agree that it clearly does?
No, because “does CEV fulfill....?” is not a well-defined or fully specified question. But I think, if you asked “whether it is possible to build FAI+CEV in such a way that it fulfills the wish(es) of literally everyone while affecting everything else the least”, they would say they do not know.
I’m very dubious of CEV as a model for Friendly AI. I think it’s a bad idea for several reasons. So, not that either.
Also, on topic, recall that, when you extrapolate the volition of crazy people, their volition is not, in particular, more sane. It is more as they would like to be. If you see lizard people, you don’t want to see lizard people less. You want sharpened senses to detect them better. Likewise, if you extrapolate a serial killer, you don’t get Ghandi. You get an incredibly good serial killer.
I don’t see how this is possible. One can be dubious about whether it can be defined in the way it is stated, or whether it can be implemented. But assuming it can, why would it be controversial to fulfill the wish(es) of literally everyone, while affecting everything else the least?
Extrapolating volition includes correcting wrong knowledge and increasing intelligence. So, you do stop seeing lizard people if they don’t exist.
Serial killers are more interesting example. But they too don’t want everyone to die. Assuming serial killers get full knowledge of their condition and sufficient intelligence for understanding it, what would their volition actually be? I don’t know, but I’m sure it’s not universal death.
Problems:
Extrapolation is poorly defined, and, to me, seems to go in either one of two directions: either you make people more as they would like to be, which throws any ideas of coherence out the window, or you make people ‘better’ a long a specific axis, in which case you’re no longer directing the question back at humanity in a meaningful sense. Even something as simple as removing wrong beliefs (as you imply) would automatically erase any but the very weakest theological notions. There are a lot of people in the world who would die to stop that from happening. So, yes, controversial.
Coherence, one way or another, is unlikely to exist. Humans want a bunch of different things. Smarter, better-informed humans would still want a bunch of different, conflicting things. Trying to satisfy all of them won’t work. Trying to satisfy the majority at the expense of the minorities might get incredibly ugly incredibly fast. I don’t have a better solution at this time, but I don’t think taking some kind of vote over the sum total of humanity is going to produce any kind of coherent plan of action.
But would that be actually uglier than the status quo? Right now, to a very good approximation, those who were born from the right vagina are satisfied at the expense of those born from the wrong vagina. Is that any better?
I call the Litany of Gendlin on the idea that everyone can’t be fully satisfied at once. And I also call the Fallacy of Gray on the idea that if you can’t do something perfectly, then doing it decently is no better than not doing it at all.
I don’t know. It conceivably could be, and there would be no possibility of improving it, ever. I’m just saying it might be wise to have a better model before we commit to something for eternity.
For extrapolation to be conceptually plausible, I imagine “knowledge” and “intelligence level” to be independent variables of a mind, knobs to turn. To be sure, this picture looks ridiculous. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that this picture is realizable, extrapolation appears to be definable.
Yes, many religious people wouldn’t want their beliefs erased, but only because they believe them to be true. They wouldn’t oppose increasing their knowledge if they knew it was true knowledge. Cases of belief in belief would be dissolved if it was known that true beliefs were better in all respects, including individual happiness.
Yes, I agree with this. But, I believe there exist wishes universal for (extrapolated) humans, among which I think there is the wish for humans to continue existing. I would like for AI to fulfil this wish (and other universal wishes if there are any), while letting people decide everything else for themselves.
It is not clear that CEV as a model for FAI does either of those things.
AFAIK, CEV is not well-defined or fully specified, except as a declaration of intent, a research direction. Thus, it does not make sense to say whether CEV as a model for FAI does or does not in fact do specific things. It only makes sense to say whether the intention of CEV’s developers for it to do or not do those things, and whether CEV’s specification so far contradicts or does not contradict those things.
AFAIU, CEV’s developers’ intent and CEV’s specification so far (with added “unanimousity” condition, if it is not present in the standard CEV specification) do not contradict my statement.
Just to make sure I understand your claim: you’re asserting that we can identify some set of people in the world right now who are “CEV’s developers,” and if we asked them “does CEV fulfill the wish(es) of literally everyone while affecting everything else the least?” they would agree that it clearly does?
No, because “does CEV fulfill....?” is not a well-defined or fully specified question. But I think, if you asked “whether it is possible to build FAI+CEV in such a way that it fulfills the wish(es) of literally everyone while affecting everything else the least”, they would say they do not know.
Ah, OK. I completely misunderstood your claim, then. Thanks for clarifying.