I’m not sure I understand the question. In reference to the sociopath issue, I think it is clearer to say: (1) “I don’t want sociopaths (and the like) in the subset from which CEV is drawn” than to say that (2) “CEV is drawn from all humanity but sociopaths are by definition not human.”
Nonetheless, I don’t think (1) and (2) are different in any important respect. They just define key terms differently in order to say the same thing. In a rational society, I suspect it would make no difference, but in the current human society, ways words can be wrong makes (2) likely to lead to errors of reasoning.
Sorry, I’m being unclear. Let me try again. For simplicity, let us say that T(x) = TRUE if x is sufficiently moral to include in CEV, and FALSE otherwise. (I don’t mean to posit that we’ve actually implemented such a test.)
I’m asking if you mean to distinguish between: (1) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE and x is human, and (2) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE
I’m still not sure I understand the question. That said, there are two issues here.
First, I would expect CEV(Klingon) to output something if CEV(human) does, but I’m not aware of any actual species that I would expect CEV(non-human species) to output for. If such a species existed (i.e. CEV(dolphins) outputs a morality), I would advocate strongly for something very like equal rights between humans and dolphins.
But even in that circumstance, I would be very surprised if CEV(all dolphins & all humans) outputted something other than “Humans, do CEV(humanity). Dolphins, do CEV(dolphin)”
Of course, I don’t expect CEV(all of humanity ever) to output because I reject moral realism.
How committed are you to the word “subset” here?
I’m not sure I understand the question. In reference to the sociopath issue, I think it is clearer to say:
(1) “I don’t want sociopaths (and the like) in the subset from which CEV is drawn”
than to say that
(2) “CEV is drawn from all humanity but sociopaths are by definition not human.”
Nonetheless, I don’t think (1) and (2) are different in any important respect. They just define key terms differently in order to say the same thing. In a rational society, I suspect it would make no difference, but in the current human society, ways words can be wrong makes (2) likely to lead to errors of reasoning.
Sorry, I’m being unclear. Let me try again.
For simplicity, let us say that T(x) = TRUE if x is sufficiently moral to include in CEV, and FALSE otherwise. (I don’t mean to posit that we’ve actually implemented such a test.)
I’m asking if you mean to distinguish between:
(1) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE and x is human, and
(2) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE
I’m still not sure I understand the question. That said, there are two issues here.
First, I would expect CEV(Klingon) to output something if CEV(human) does, but I’m not aware of any actual species that I would expect CEV(non-human species) to output for. If such a species existed (i.e. CEV(dolphins) outputs a morality), I would advocate strongly for something very like equal rights between humans and dolphins.
But even in that circumstance, I would be very surprised if CEV(all dolphins & all humans) outputted something other than “Humans, do CEV(humanity). Dolphins, do CEV(dolphin)”
Of course, I don’t expect CEV(all of humanity ever) to output because I reject moral realism.
I think that answers my question. Thanks.