Hmm, I would disagree. If you have a metaphysical claim, then arguments for or against this claim are not normally epistemological; they’re just arguments.
Think of epistemology as “being meta about knowledge, all the time, and nothing else”.
What does it mean to know something?
How can we know something?
What’s the difference between “knowing” a definition and “knowing” a theorem?
Are there statements such that to know them true, you need no input from the outside world at all? (Kant’s analytic vs synthetic distinction).
Is 2+2=4 one such?
If you know something is true, but it turns out later it was false, did you actually “know” it? (many millions of words have been written on this question alone).
Now, take some metaphysical claim, and let’s take an especially grand one, say “God is infinite and omnipresent” or something. You could argue for or against that claim without ever going into epistemology. You could maybe argue that the idea of God as absolute perfection more or less requires Him to be present everywhere, in the smallest atom and the remotest star, at all times because otherwise it would be short of perfection, or something like this. Or you could say that if God is present everywhere, that’s the same as if He was present nowhere, because presence manifests by the difference between presence and absence.
But of course if you are a modern person and especially one inclined to scientific thinking, you would likely respond to all this “Hey, what does it even mean to say all this or for me to argue this? How would I know if God is omnipresent or not omnipresent, what would change in the world for me to perceive it? Without some sort of epistemological underpinning to this claim, what’s the difference between it and a string of empty words?”
And then you would be proceeding in the tradition started by Descartes, who arguably moved the center of philosophical thinking from metaphysics to epistemology in what’s called the “epistemological turn”, later boosted in the 20th century by the “lingustic turn” (attributed among others to Wittgenstein).
Metaphysics: X, amirite?
Epistemological turn: What does it even mean to know X?
Linguistic turn: What does it even mean to say X?
Hmm, I would disagree. If you have a metaphysical claim, then arguments for or against this claim are not normally epistemological; they’re just arguments.
Think of epistemology as “being meta about knowledge, all the time, and nothing else”.
What does it mean to know something? How can we know something? What’s the difference between “knowing” a definition and “knowing” a theorem? Are there statements such that to know them true, you need no input from the outside world at all? (Kant’s analytic vs synthetic distinction). Is 2+2=4 one such? If you know something is true, but it turns out later it was false, did you actually “know” it? (many millions of words have been written on this question alone).
Now, take some metaphysical claim, and let’s take an especially grand one, say “God is infinite and omnipresent” or something. You could argue for or against that claim without ever going into epistemology. You could maybe argue that the idea of God as absolute perfection more or less requires Him to be present everywhere, in the smallest atom and the remotest star, at all times because otherwise it would be short of perfection, or something like this. Or you could say that if God is present everywhere, that’s the same as if He was present nowhere, because presence manifests by the difference between presence and absence.
But of course if you are a modern person and especially one inclined to scientific thinking, you would likely respond to all this “Hey, what does it even mean to say all this or for me to argue this? How would I know if God is omnipresent or not omnipresent, what would change in the world for me to perceive it? Without some sort of epistemological underpinning to this claim, what’s the difference between it and a string of empty words?”
And then you would be proceeding in the tradition started by Descartes, who arguably moved the center of philosophical thinking from metaphysics to epistemology in what’s called the “epistemological turn”, later boosted in the 20th century by the “lingustic turn” (attributed among others to Wittgenstein).
Metaphysics: X, amirite? Epistemological turn: What does it even mean to know X? Linguistic turn: What does it even mean to say X?