I tend to view game strategies that lead to the best stable equilibrium as moral injunctions ( tit for tat, cooperate first) These are provable ( under certain assumptions) so I lean towards saying they are “real”
Yeah, I have similar ideas. On the other hand, rules that are Nash equilibria in the current “environment” are in some ways determined by the preferences of the (by now, long dead) agents (and even their initial bargaining positions). I’m having a hard time deciding how to categorize this kind of “morality” (if it can, in truth, be called such a thing). I ended up going with “Lean toward: moral anti-realism”.
I tend to view game strategies that lead to the best stable equilibrium as moral injunctions ( tit for tat, cooperate first) These are provable ( under certain assumptions) so I lean towards saying they are “real”
Yeah, I have similar ideas. On the other hand, rules that are Nash equilibria in the current “environment” are in some ways determined by the preferences of the (by now, long dead) agents (and even their initial bargaining positions). I’m having a hard time deciding how to categorize this kind of “morality” (if it can, in truth, be called such a thing). I ended up going with “Lean toward: moral anti-realism”.