Ahh, that. What would be an empirical difference between the two? If none, then there is nothing to resolve.
But that’s the whole question: is it affine or non-affine?
As to what empirical difference it makes (and whether or not ‘none’ means that the question is meaningless) is I suppose a matter for another survey question.
But, if you think Julian Barbour or EY are generally on the right track about the implications of quantum physics, then you’re a B-theorist. Fundamentally, the rejection of A-theory is the rejection of the reality of change. If you’re a B-theorist, change is on the map, but not anywhere in the territory.
Ah, again. See, it matters to me not in the least whether it’s A or B or something else, if they predict all the same things. (As far as I can tell, they predict nothing of consequence, so they are not interesting at all.) As for Barbour, his models have nothing testable in them, as far I know (replace time with “change”? so?), which is a big negative against them. Whether the “block universe” notion is a good one still remains to be seen, so far it is not instrumentally useful. I do not understand EY’s fascination with Barbour. At least MWI, when taken literally, has a chance of being falsifiable.
First, I would not want to give a wrong impression. While I do have a PhD, physics is not my day job.
Ahh, that. What would be an empirical difference between the two? If none, then there is nothing to resolve.
But that’s the whole question: is it affine or non-affine?
As to what empirical difference it makes (and whether or not ‘none’ means that the question is meaningless) is I suppose a matter for another survey question.
But, if you think Julian Barbour or EY are generally on the right track about the implications of quantum physics, then you’re a B-theorist. Fundamentally, the rejection of A-theory is the rejection of the reality of change. If you’re a B-theorist, change is on the map, but not anywhere in the territory.
Ah, again. See, it matters to me not in the least whether it’s A or B or something else, if they predict all the same things. (As far as I can tell, they predict nothing of consequence, so they are not interesting at all.) As for Barbour, his models have nothing testable in them, as far I know (replace time with “change”? so?), which is a big negative against them. Whether the “block universe” notion is a good one still remains to be seen, so far it is not instrumentally useful. I do not understand EY’s fascination with Barbour. At least MWI, when taken literally, has a chance of being falsifiable.
I think that’s a pretty good ‘other’ answer to the question. Thanks for taking the time.