If you take Dennett’s intentional stance towards our mental states, I think you can only do so by considering the external environment that the brain is operating in. Which I guess makes me an externalist (which is what I answered), but I’m not sure whether that’s the traditional definition.
I wrote a book on Dennett, read the vast majority of what he wrote, and agree with both of you on the
Intentional Stance --> Externalism. If that is worth something.
Dennett’s notional worlds are not externalist, but not contain properties philosophy usually ascribes the category of mental states, such as beliefs. ”Beyond Belief” for more on Dennett on that.
If you take Dennett’s intentional stance towards our mental states, I think you can only do so by considering the external environment that the brain is operating in. Which I guess makes me an externalist (which is what I answered), but I’m not sure whether that’s the traditional definition.
Also voted for “externalism” for the same reason.
I wrote a book on Dennett, read the vast majority of what he wrote, and agree with both of you on the Intentional Stance --> Externalism.
If that is worth something.
Dennett’s notional worlds are not externalist, but not contain properties philosophy usually ascribes the category of mental states, such as beliefs.
”Beyond Belief” for more on Dennett on that.