I think there might be a difference here between truth of a proposition and truth of a sentence.
Ascribing truth to a proposition looks the same as just asserting the proposition (deflationary account).
Ascribing truth to a sentence looks like a combination of mapping it onto a proposition (interpreting the sentence) and then asserting that proposition.
Since I would regard propositions and states of affairs as either the same, or isomorphic, this looks like the correspondence theory of truth for sentences.
I strongly agree. This has been discussed in the literature, I believe. For instance, it comes up in discussions of the semantic paradoxes. There is no paradox involved in “disquotation” for propositions: the proposition that p just is the proposition that it’s true that p.
When you’re talking about sentences though, you run into the liar paradox if you say that “p” is true if and only if p.
I think there might be a difference here between truth of a proposition and truth of a sentence.
Ascribing truth to a proposition looks the same as just asserting the proposition (deflationary account).
Ascribing truth to a sentence looks like a combination of mapping it onto a proposition (interpreting the sentence) and then asserting that proposition.
Since I would regard propositions and states of affairs as either the same, or isomorphic, this looks like the correspondence theory of truth for sentences.
I strongly agree. This has been discussed in the literature, I believe. For instance, it comes up in discussions of the semantic paradoxes. There is no paradox involved in “disquotation” for propositions: the proposition that p just is the proposition that it’s true that p.
When you’re talking about sentences though, you run into the liar paradox if you say that “p” is true if and only if p.