Well, using pragmatist’s cited definition of correspondence theory, a proposition is true if and only if it bears some sort of congruence relation to a state of affairs that obtains.
What state of affairs is “correspondence theory is true” congruent with?
I can’t think of any.
If you can, I’ll happily be convinced my argument doesn’t hold, but basically it seems to me that correspondence theory lays out a framework for thinking about truth, just as governmental constitutions lay out a framework for thinking about law. Correspondence theory itself is no more true (or false) than constitutions are legal (or illegal).
Well, using pragmatist’s cited definition of correspondence theory, a proposition is true if and only if it bears some sort of congruence relation to a state of affairs that obtains.
What state of affairs is “correspondence theory is true” congruent with?
I can’t think of any.
If you can, I’ll happily be convinced my argument doesn’t hold, but basically it seems to me that correspondence theory lays out a framework for thinking about truth, just as governmental constitutions lay out a framework for thinking about law. Correspondence theory itself is no more true (or false) than constitutions are legal (or illegal).
The concept of scientific truth—the concept used by scientists—is the state of affairs some correspondence theories purport to be congruent with.