I think that’s a weak enough claim that you can’t really call it a general moral principle.
That’s a good point. So I should take from Luke’s claim that he does not believe one should (as a moral rule) maximise expected utility, or anything like that? And that he would say that it’s possible (if perhaps unlikely) for an action to be good even if it minimizes expected utility?
That’s a good point. So I should take from Luke’s claim that he does not believe one should (as a moral rule) maximise expected utility, or anything like that? And that he would say that it’s possible (if perhaps unlikely) for an action to be good even if it minimizes expected utility?
I probably shouldn’t speak for Luke, but I’m guessing the answer to this is yes. If it isn’t, then I don’t understand how he’s a particularist.
I don’t see why he should be committed to this claim.