Understanding causal structure seems to be something that is kind of shiny and impressive sounding,
connotationally, but doesn’t mean much
No, it means a whole lot. You need to get the causal structure right, or at least reasonably close, or your model is garbage for policy. See also: “irrational policy of managing the news.”
I fight this fight, along with my colleagues, in much simpler settings than weather. And it is still difficult.
The whole “normative sociology” concept has its origins in a joke that Robert Nozick made, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, where he claimed, in an offhand way, that “Normative sociology, the study of what the causes of problems ought to be, greatly fascinates us all”(247). Despite the casual manner in which he made the remark, the observation is an astute one. Often when we study social problems, there is an almost irresistible temptation to study what we would like the cause of those problems to be (for whatever reason), to the neglect of the actual causes. When this goes uncorrected, you can get the phenomenon of “politically correct” explanations for various social problems – where there’s no hard evidence that A actually causes B, but where people, for one reason or another, think that A ought to be the explanation for B. This can lead to a situation in which denying that A is the cause of B becomes morally stigmatized, and so people affirm the connection primarily because they feel obliged to, not because they’ve been persuaded by any evidence.
If I read back I also read things like this:
No, it means a whole lot. You need to get the causal structure right, or at least reasonably close, or your model is garbage for policy. See also: “irrational policy of managing the news.”
I fight this fight, along with my colleagues, in much simpler settings than weather. And it is still difficult.
Related. Sample:
Getting causal structure right in that sense is not an alternative to modelling, it is part of getting modelling right.