[Note: mostly just me trying to order my thoughts, kind of hoping someone can see and tell me where my confusion comes from]
So the key insight regarding suffering seems to be that pain is not equal to suffering. Instead there is a mental motion (flinching away from pain) that produces (or is equal to?) suffering. And whereas most people see pain as intrinsically bad, Looking allows you to differentiate between the pain and the flinching away, realizing that pain in and of itself is not bad. It also allows you to get rid of the flinching away, thus eliminating the suffering, but without eliminating the pain. But is the flinching away intrinsically bad? Or is it also possible to defuse from the flinching in a way that makes it less unpleasant?
And then, is there also an equivalent for good experiences? Pain is to suffering as pleasure is to…? Is there a mental motion of turning towards, or welcoming an experience, which is ultimately responsible for seeing pleasurable experiences as good? And if the flinching away is in some way intrinsically bad, is this opposite motion intrinsically good?
Now, once you get that pain is not equal to suffering, and you’ve thus managed to eliminate suffering for you personally, what reasons remain to try to change something about what you expect to experience in the future? If you still care about other people suffering, then of course there is plenty to do, to reduce other people’s suffering by reducing the pain they experience. But it wouldn’t really be about the pain, just the reaction to the pain.
Then, suppose we somehow managed that all people (or conscious entities) no longer experience the flinching from pain suffering. Would there still be reasons to make the world “better”, or would we be content with things just unfolding however, because as long as we don’t suffer over it, nothing is intrinsically bad? Is the kind of suffering that comes from the flinching away from pain maybe the only thing that is bad in a morally relevant way? Once suffering is out of the picture, what kinds of wants, preferences, reasons or values remain, that actually make a difference to how the world is supposed to look? Intuitively, a world in which suffering is eliminated via getting rid of an aversion to pain feels very much like a world where everyone is wireheaded and would contain very little value, if any. I have a sense of it being a bad thing if people are feeling okay (or great, in the case of actual wireheading) while the world is actually really shitty. Now is this sense of it being a bad thing due to values that I hold which go beyond pleasure and suffering, and are they stable under reflection? Or is the correct conclusion that yes, once nobody suffers anymore, it doesn’t matter if the rest of the world looks really bad? Is the reason it feels so bad simply because I still have the alief that pain is intrinsically bad, and Looking would allow me to see that pain really is in a way irrelevant?
if you truly step outside your entire motivational system, then that leaves the part that just stepped out with no motivational system,
And if you see yourself going to the store to get some food, well, why not go along with that? After all, to stop acting as you always have, would require some special motivation to do so.
Even if you do manage to defuse from everything that causes you suffering, your existing personality and motivational system will still be in charge of what it is that you Look at in the future.
These quotes, as well as what I remember others saying about enlightenment, make it sound like there is still ultimately a “self” or “I” that is the one that “steps outside your motivational system”, “sees yourself going to the store”, “manages to defuse”, or “sees through the illusion of the self”. But if I understand correctly, what actually happens is that there is a conscious process that makes one of these motions, but it doesn’t have any privileged position and is no more the “true self” than e.g. the urge to go to the store. So ultimately all these different parts, insights, and thoughts are just part of the same single person. I would have initially expected this to mean that there would be feedback between the different parts (e.g. realizing pain isn’t so bad should also eliminate the motivations for avoiding pain). But upon reflection, it seems like those kinds of insights are only possible because there is no feedback between the different parts? I feel like I may be mixing together some things here that are actually separate.
But is the flinching away intrinsically bad? Or is it also possible to defuse from the flinching in a way that makes it less unpleasant?
I’m confused about what you mean by “intrinsically bad” here, and especially given the relationship of the second question to the first question, suspect that your concept of “intrinsically bad” conflates at least two things. Your second question is much easier to answer: yes, you can defuse from flinching, and yes, that makes it less unpleasant.
Is there a mental motion of turning towards, or welcoming an experience, which is ultimately responsible for seeing pleasurable experiences as good? And if the flinching away is in some way intrinsically bad, is this opposite motion intrinsically good?
Yes, there is a mental motion of welcoming an experience, and you can do it to any experience, not just pleasurable ones; you can even find joy in welcoming any experience, not just pleasurable ones. I am still confused about what you mean by “intrinsically good.”
Now, once you get that pain is not equal to suffering, and you’ve thus managed to eliminate suffering for you personally, what reasons remain to try to change something about what you expect to experience in the future?
Because you want to. (I’m not sure how to explain what I mean by this. For me the internal experience of “I want this” is quite different from the experience of “I am chasing after this in order to escape from pain / suffering,” but the distinction may not be experientially clear for many / most people.)
Then, suppose we somehow managed that all people (or conscious entities) no longer experience the flinching from pain suffering. Would there still be reasons to make the world “better”, or would we be content with things just unfolding however, because as long as we don’t suffer over it, nothing is intrinsically bad?
Yes, lots. I used to flinch away from pain constantly; I do it less now, which means I’m more free to do things that I want to do, like make music and hug people and generally flourish and encourage human flourishing. Also, I increasingly suspect you have some confusion wrapped up in your concept of “intrinsically good / bad.”
Is the kind of suffering that comes from the flinching away from pain maybe the only thing that is bad in a morally relevant way?
Nope.
Once suffering is out of the picture, what kinds of wants, preferences, reasons or values remain, that actually make a difference to how the world is supposed to look?
Uh… all of… the other ones?
Or is the correct conclusion that yes, once nobody suffers anymore, it doesn’t matter if the rest of the world looks really bad?
I’m confused about what you mean by this and what it would mean to answer this question, mostly because I don’t know what you mean by “matter.”
I feel like I may be mixing together some things here that are actually separate.
Yes, I think so too. Can you try paying a lot of attention to what comes up when you think about the concept of “intrinsically good” or “intrinsically bad” (edit: also “suffering” and “mattering”) and just write down literally everything that pops into your head, including words or sentences that sound outrageous or too dramatic or whatever?
In this post, Nate Soares outlines a thing he calls “Moving Towards the Goal”, which feels incredibly relevant to this conversation.
This leads us to my second trick for avoiding akrasia: I am not Trying Really Hard. People who are Trying Really Hard give themselves rewards for progress or punishments for failure. They incentivize the behavior that they want to have. They keep on deciding to continue doing what they’re doing, and they engage in valiant battle against akrasia. I don’t do any of that.
Instead, I simply Move Towards the Goal.
I’d highly recommend Nate’s Replacing Guilt sequence. In a very concrete, “traditional LW” way, he lays out how you can still do cool stuff, yet not think in terms of shoulds, guilt, or intrinsically good or bad.
And then, is there also an equivalent for good experiences? Pain is to suffering as pleasure is to…? Is there a mental motion of turning towards, or welcoming an experience, which is ultimately responsible for seeing pleasurable experiences as good? And if the flinching away is in some way intrinsically bad, is this opposite motion intrinsically good?
I wonder about this too. If there is pleasure and the mental experience of welcoming a pleasure, then what happens if you stop ‘welcoming a pleasure’?
Wouldn’t you no longer be motivated to pursue pleasure? How would you ever feel happy? Would pleasure feel ‘bland’ or unsatisfying? I also wonder if it’s possible to mistakenly decouple pleasure and ‘welcoming a pleasure’ without ever meditating?
[Note: mostly just me trying to order my thoughts, kind of hoping someone can see and tell me where my confusion comes from]
So the key insight regarding suffering seems to be that pain is not equal to suffering. Instead there is a mental motion (flinching away from pain) that produces (or is equal to?) suffering. And whereas most people see pain as intrinsically bad, Looking allows you to differentiate between the pain and the flinching away, realizing that pain in and of itself is not bad. It also allows you to get rid of the flinching away, thus eliminating the suffering, but without eliminating the pain. But is the flinching away intrinsically bad? Or is it also possible to defuse from the flinching in a way that makes it less unpleasant?
And then, is there also an equivalent for good experiences? Pain is to suffering as pleasure is to…? Is there a mental motion of turning towards, or welcoming an experience, which is ultimately responsible for seeing pleasurable experiences as good? And if the flinching away is in some way intrinsically bad, is this opposite motion intrinsically good?
Now, once you get that pain is not equal to suffering, and you’ve thus managed to eliminate suffering for you personally, what reasons remain to try to change something about what you expect to experience in the future? If you still care about other people suffering, then of course there is plenty to do, to reduce other people’s suffering by reducing the pain they experience. But it wouldn’t really be about the pain, just the reaction to the pain.
Then, suppose we somehow managed that all people (or conscious entities) no longer experience the flinching from pain suffering. Would there still be reasons to make the world “better”, or would we be content with things just unfolding however, because as long as we don’t suffer over it, nothing is intrinsically bad? Is the kind of suffering that comes from the flinching away from pain maybe the only thing that is bad in a morally relevant way? Once suffering is out of the picture, what kinds of wants, preferences, reasons or values remain, that actually make a difference to how the world is supposed to look? Intuitively, a world in which suffering is eliminated via getting rid of an aversion to pain feels very much like a world where everyone is wireheaded and would contain very little value, if any. I have a sense of it being a bad thing if people are feeling okay (or great, in the case of actual wireheading) while the world is actually really shitty. Now is this sense of it being a bad thing due to values that I hold which go beyond pleasure and suffering, and are they stable under reflection? Or is the correct conclusion that yes, once nobody suffers anymore, it doesn’t matter if the rest of the world looks really bad? Is the reason it feels so bad simply because I still have the alief that pain is intrinsically bad, and Looking would allow me to see that pain really is in a way irrelevant?
These quotes, as well as what I remember others saying about enlightenment, make it sound like there is still ultimately a “self” or “I” that is the one that “steps outside your motivational system”, “sees yourself going to the store”, “manages to defuse”, or “sees through the illusion of the self”. But if I understand correctly, what actually happens is that there is a conscious process that makes one of these motions, but it doesn’t have any privileged position and is no more the “true self” than e.g. the urge to go to the store. So ultimately all these different parts, insights, and thoughts are just part of the same single person. I would have initially expected this to mean that there would be feedback between the different parts (e.g. realizing pain isn’t so bad should also eliminate the motivations for avoiding pain). But upon reflection, it seems like those kinds of insights are only possible because there is no feedback between the different parts? I feel like I may be mixing together some things here that are actually separate.
I’m confused about what you mean by “intrinsically bad” here, and especially given the relationship of the second question to the first question, suspect that your concept of “intrinsically bad” conflates at least two things. Your second question is much easier to answer: yes, you can defuse from flinching, and yes, that makes it less unpleasant.
Yes, there is a mental motion of welcoming an experience, and you can do it to any experience, not just pleasurable ones; you can even find joy in welcoming any experience, not just pleasurable ones. I am still confused about what you mean by “intrinsically good.”
Because you want to. (I’m not sure how to explain what I mean by this. For me the internal experience of “I want this” is quite different from the experience of “I am chasing after this in order to escape from pain / suffering,” but the distinction may not be experientially clear for many / most people.)
Yes, lots. I used to flinch away from pain constantly; I do it less now, which means I’m more free to do things that I want to do, like make music and hug people and generally flourish and encourage human flourishing. Also, I increasingly suspect you have some confusion wrapped up in your concept of “intrinsically good / bad.”
Nope.
Uh… all of… the other ones?
I’m confused about what you mean by this and what it would mean to answer this question, mostly because I don’t know what you mean by “matter.”
Yes, I think so too. Can you try paying a lot of attention to what comes up when you think about the concept of “intrinsically good” or “intrinsically bad” (edit: also “suffering” and “mattering”) and just write down literally everything that pops into your head, including words or sentences that sound outrageous or too dramatic or whatever?
In this post, Nate Soares outlines a thing he calls “Moving Towards the Goal”, which feels incredibly relevant to this conversation.
I’d highly recommend Nate’s Replacing Guilt sequence. In a very concrete, “traditional LW” way, he lays out how you can still do cool stuff, yet not think in terms of shoulds, guilt, or intrinsically good or bad.
I wonder about this too. If there is pleasure and the mental experience of welcoming a pleasure, then what happens if you stop ‘welcoming a pleasure’?
Wouldn’t you no longer be motivated to pursue pleasure? How would you ever feel happy? Would pleasure feel ‘bland’ or unsatisfying? I also wonder if it’s possible to mistakenly decouple pleasure and ‘welcoming a pleasure’ without ever meditating?
Seems like “Are Wireheads Happy?” is relevant to this.