The question is then whether that noncomputable stuff is necessary to aspects of experience that we should care about
Well, I would say “that we care about”; it’s not clear to me what it means to say about an aspect of experience that I don’t care about it but I should. But I think that’s a digression.
Leaving that aside, I agree: the only way to be sure that X is sufficient to build a brain is to do X and get a brain out of it. Until we do that, we don’t know.
But if supporting a project to build a brain via X prior to having that certainty is a sign of accepting an “article of faith,” then, well, my answer to your original question is that what underlies that article of faith is support for doing the experiment.
By way of analogy: the only way to be sure that X is sufficient to build a heavier-than-air flying machine is to do X and see if it flies. And if doing X requires a lot of time and energy and enthusiasm, then it’s unsurprising if the first community to do X takes as “an article of faith” that X is sufficient.
I have no problem with that, in and of itself; my question is what happens when someone does X and the machine doesn’t fly. If that breaks the community’s faith and they go on to endorse something else, then I endorse the mechanism underlying their faith.
As for why the idea of mind-as-computation seems plausible… well, of all the tools we have, computers currently seem like the best bet for building an artificial mind out of, so that’s where we’re concentrating our time and energy and enthusiasm. That seems reasonable to me.
That said, if in N years neurobiology advances to the point where we can engineer artificial structures out of neurons as readily as we can out of silicon, I expect you’ll see a lot of enthusiastic endorsement of AI projects built out of neurons. (I also expect that you’ll see a lot of criticism that a mere neural structure lacks something-or-other that brains have, and therefore cannot conceivably be intelligent.)
Heh! Funny, I was just reading the bit in Anslie’s Breakdown of Will where he discusses the function of beliefs as mobilizing one’s motivations, and now feel obliged to be more tolerant of beliefs that I suspect are confused or mistaken but which motivate activities I endorse—in this case, “running the experiment”, as you say. So I guess I don’t disagree. :) Thanks for the thoughtful response!
Well, I would say “that we care about”; it’s not clear to me what it means to say about an aspect of experience that I don’t care about it but I should. But I think that’s a digression.
Leaving that aside, I agree: the only way to be sure that X is sufficient to build a brain is to do X and get a brain out of it. Until we do that, we don’t know.
But if supporting a project to build a brain via X prior to having that certainty is a sign of accepting an “article of faith,” then, well, my answer to your original question is that what underlies that article of faith is support for doing the experiment.
By way of analogy: the only way to be sure that X is sufficient to build a heavier-than-air flying machine is to do X and see if it flies. And if doing X requires a lot of time and energy and enthusiasm, then it’s unsurprising if the first community to do X takes as “an article of faith” that X is sufficient.
I have no problem with that, in and of itself; my question is what happens when someone does X and the machine doesn’t fly. If that breaks the community’s faith and they go on to endorse something else, then I endorse the mechanism underlying their faith.
As for why the idea of mind-as-computation seems plausible… well, of all the tools we have, computers currently seem like the best bet for building an artificial mind out of, so that’s where we’re concentrating our time and energy and enthusiasm. That seems reasonable to me.
That said, if in N years neurobiology advances to the point where we can engineer artificial structures out of neurons as readily as we can out of silicon, I expect you’ll see a lot of enthusiastic endorsement of AI projects built out of neurons. (I also expect that you’ll see a lot of criticism that a mere neural structure lacks something-or-other that brains have, and therefore cannot conceivably be intelligent.)
Heh! Funny, I was just reading the bit in Anslie’s Breakdown of Will where he discusses the function of beliefs as mobilizing one’s motivations, and now feel obliged to be more tolerant of beliefs that I suspect are confused or mistaken but which motivate activities I endorse—in this case, “running the experiment”, as you say. So I guess I don’t disagree. :) Thanks for the thoughtful response!