Nice! I. J. Good himself pointed to another example of how this rule might break in his paper appropriately titled (for my post anyway), “The White Shoe is a Red Herring”,
Suppose that we know we are in one or other of two worlds, and the hypothesis, H, under consideration is that all the ravens in our world are black. We know in advance that in one world there are a hundred black ravens, no non-black ravens, and a million other birds; and that in the other world there are a thousand black ravens, one white raven, and a million other birds. A bird is selected equiprobably at random from all the birds in our world. It turns out to be a black raven. This is strong evidence (a Bayes-Jefrreys-Turing factor of about 10) that we are in the second world, wherein not all ravens are black.
From Wikipedia,
Hempel rejected this as a solution to the paradox, insisting that the proposition ‘c is a raven and is black’ must be considered “by itself and without reference to any other information”, and pointing out that it ”… was emphasized in section 5.2(b) of my article in Mind … that the very appearance of paradoxicality in cases like that of the white shoe results in part from a failure to observe this maxim.”
ETA: I now see that the paper you linked cites this example. Cool.
Note that if you are a Solomonoff inductor, seeing a black raven doesn’t always increase your credence that all ravens are black: see this paper.
Nice! I. J. Good himself pointed to another example of how this rule might break in his paper appropriately titled (for my post anyway), “The White Shoe is a Red Herring”,
From Wikipedia,
ETA: I now see that the paper you linked cites this example. Cool.