If physics is not applicable to understanding the nature of the universe then we are all in a lot of trouble.
Tell me; are you in the habit of using English grammar as the ruleset for arranging Zen gardens?
Physics is topically contingent to “the physical”. The Laws of Physics as we know them have further been derived through Popperian Falsification. Even within our own lightcone we still from time to time see the revival of conjecture as to whether the gravity constant or others are actually constant or if they vary from one region to another. Because nothing outside our lightcone interacts with us, we have no way of knowing which, if any, of the Laws of Physics we yet have are applicable. We can assume—certainly—but this does not inform us of anything other than our assumptions. Conjecture without corroboration is not derived information on the subject matter.
And all of this is even assuming that there’s “physical” out there at all. Which, again, because it is not observable—we have no way of knowing at all. It could be nothing. It could be a micron larger than our lightcone. It could be a mile. Or it could be infinite. Or, under certain even more bizarre conceptions (involving inversions of topology and strange physics), there could conceivably even be less than what we observe.
All of this without getting into philosophical “trickery” such as the simulated universe argument.
So, yes. Physics is not applicable to answering the question “what is there beyond the Earth’s Lightcone?”.
Given assumptions that seem natural now. I don’t actually disagree with those assumptions. But those assumptions are, in fact, assumptions. (Recall the bizarre topology example that permits for negative space beyond our lightcone.)
Given, furthermore, what the original question was—P(Universe-is-Infinite) -- the question of whether there’s even a ‘something’ out beyond the lightcone remains even-more-relevant.
And as I originally, I believe, said—the low confidence interval necessary to properly express a Bayesian probability prediction in my opinion makes it far more ‘appropriate’ to simply say, “There is as yet insufficient evidence for a meaningful reply.” (Or, short-handed: “It’s unknowable.”)
Tell me; are you in the habit of using English grammar as the ruleset for arranging Zen gardens?
Physics is topically contingent to “the physical”. The Laws of Physics as we know them have further been derived through Popperian Falsification. Even within our own lightcone we still from time to time see the revival of conjecture as to whether the gravity constant or others are actually constant or if they vary from one region to another. Because nothing outside our lightcone interacts with us, we have no way of knowing which, if any, of the Laws of Physics we yet have are applicable. We can assume—certainly—but this does not inform us of anything other than our assumptions. Conjecture without corroboration is not derived information on the subject matter.
And all of this is even assuming that there’s “physical” out there at all. Which, again, because it is not observable—we have no way of knowing at all. It could be nothing. It could be a micron larger than our lightcone. It could be a mile. Or it could be infinite. Or, under certain even more bizarre conceptions (involving inversions of topology and strange physics), there could conceivably even be less than what we observe.
All of this without getting into philosophical “trickery” such as the simulated universe argument.
So, yes. Physics is not applicable to answering the question “what is there beyond the Earth’s Lightcone?”.
I don’t know precisely how likely these three options are, but infinite seems astronomically more likely that any arbitrary amount.
Given assumptions that seem natural now. I don’t actually disagree with those assumptions. But those assumptions are, in fact, assumptions. (Recall the bizarre topology example that permits for negative space beyond our lightcone.)
Given, furthermore, what the original question was—P(Universe-is-Infinite) -- the question of whether there’s even a ‘something’ out beyond the lightcone remains even-more-relevant.
And as I originally, I believe, said—the low confidence interval necessary to properly express a Bayesian probability prediction in my opinion makes it far more ‘appropriate’ to simply say, “There is as yet insufficient evidence for a meaningful reply.” (Or, short-handed: “It’s unknowable.”)