So, this is correct enough, but I would recommend generalizing the principle.
The (nominally) interesting thing about Pascal’s Mugging scenarios (and also about the original Pascal’s Wager, which inspired them) is that we can posit hypothetical scenarios that involve utility shifts so vast that even if they are vanishingly unlikely scenarios, the result of multiplying the probability of the scenario by the magnitude of the utility shift should it come to pass is still substantial. This allows a decision system that operates based on the expected value of a scenario (that is, the expected value of the scenario times its likelihood) to be manipulated by presenting it with carefully tailored scenarios of this sort (e.g., Pascal’s mugging).
It’s conceivable that a well-calibrated decision system would not be subject to such manipulation, because it would assign each scenario a probability that reflected such things… e.g., it would estimate the likelihood of there actually existing an Omega capable of creating 2N units of disutility as no more than .5 the likelihood of an Omega capable of creating only N units.
But I’ve never met any decision system that well calibrated. So, as bounded systems running on inadequate corrupted hardware, we have to come up with other tactics that keep us from driving off cliffs.
In general, one such tactic is to maintain a broader perspective than just the specific problem I’ve been invited to think about.
So when the Mugger asserts that there is a mugging, I can ask “Why should I care? What other things do I have roughly the same reason to care about, and why is my attention being directed to this particular choice within that set?”
The same thing goes when Pascal himself argues that I ought to worship the Christian God, for example, because no matter how unlikely I consider His existence, the sheer magnitude of the stakes (Heaven and Hell) dwarf that unlikelihood. If I find that compelling, I should find a vast number of competing Gods’ claims equally compelling.
The same thing goes (on a smaller scale) when someone tries to sell me insurance against some specific bad thing happening.
So, this is correct enough, but I would recommend generalizing the principle.
The (nominally) interesting thing about Pascal’s Mugging scenarios (and also about the original Pascal’s Wager, which inspired them) is that we can posit hypothetical scenarios that involve utility shifts so vast that even if they are vanishingly unlikely scenarios, the result of multiplying the probability of the scenario by the magnitude of the utility shift should it come to pass is still substantial. This allows a decision system that operates based on the expected value of a scenario (that is, the expected value of the scenario times its likelihood) to be manipulated by presenting it with carefully tailored scenarios of this sort (e.g., Pascal’s mugging).
It’s conceivable that a well-calibrated decision system would not be subject to such manipulation, because it would assign each scenario a probability that reflected such things… e.g., it would estimate the likelihood of there actually existing an Omega capable of creating 2N units of disutility as no more than .5 the likelihood of an Omega capable of creating only N units.
But I’ve never met any decision system that well calibrated. So, as bounded systems running on inadequate corrupted hardware, we have to come up with other tactics that keep us from driving off cliffs.
In general, one such tactic is to maintain a broader perspective than just the specific problem I’ve been invited to think about.
So when the Mugger asserts that there is a mugging, I can ask “Why should I care? What other things do I have roughly the same reason to care about, and why is my attention being directed to this particular choice within that set?”
The same thing goes when Pascal himself argues that I ought to worship the Christian God, for example, because no matter how unlikely I consider His existence, the sheer magnitude of the stakes (Heaven and Hell) dwarf that unlikelihood. If I find that compelling, I should find a vast number of competing Gods’ claims equally compelling.
The same thing goes (on a smaller scale) when someone tries to sell me insurance against some specific bad thing happening.