Please don’t throw around accusations of “lying” because you had a different interpretation of some studies than they did. Even if they are objectively wrong about some, this could easily be errors, not malicious lies. (Not arguing about the object level here).
I do not merely have “a different interpretation of some studies” to SMTM- or at least, this is not centrally why I make the rather specific accusation I do (which I stand entirely by) (A few points of closer-to-object-level disagreement to follow, concluding with my “real” response here, if you want to skip ahead).
The first of three instances I cite here is closest to the pattern you describe, and even there, I wouldn’t suggest they were being purposefully misrepresentational if they had cited and disagreed with the paper in question. What we have instead is a paper clearly stating/providing, in its abstract and conclusion (and quite frankly, there is no other reasonable interpretation of the data they provide- one could dispute the data, but SMTM does not go this route) a causal story for secular weight gain (specifically during childhood), and SMTM using that citation narrowly to, in effect, make the contrary point (that this is a big old mystery, that our forebears ate more “bad” food than we did and mysteriously didn’t get fat). It gets worse, mind you, though I was trying to keep my initial comment (relatively) brief- since this is immediately followed up wth “we don’t seem to have any idea what that thing was”. I’m of the view that if SMTM had good reason to disagree with this and other papers they cite (to say nothing of the mass which address this question besides, but I’m not merely accusing them of being uninformed, as I said), then they should either explain why in individual cases, or give some reason for a blanket-dismissal of the literature (which they remain happy to cite for their own purposes, mind you, so the reason can’t be “utter incompetence of people in the field).
The second point simply leaps from a claim about percentages of intake to a claim about absolute intake with precisely no citation, explanation, or argument, in a way that clearly equivocates (I’ve had several conversations with people who have, in fact, “fallen for” this). SMTM are not fools, and they’re often praised for the quality of their writing, so I struggle to believe this was an innocent mistake. I won’t go over point 3, but I’ll make a more general point, a little further from the object level here too.
I think what can be an epistemic virtue in discussion can risk becoming a failure mode in action. Extending the sort of charity required to assume SMTM are merely misguided, or that a mere factual disagreement exists among us, despite evidence to the contrary, is a Good Thing, even if not strictly accurate, while we’re debating diet models, or considering the effects of lithium on body fat, or whatever else. We want to engage with the strongest possible version of our counterparts position, or at least engage on assumptions of good faith. That’s all great, and a positive thing in general about the LW/ACX/Rationalist community. On the other hand, if you’re trying to buy a car, or are contemplating a business deal, or (as here) are considering where to give money to charity, between “nets for african children”, “AI alignment”, ” When thinking in the domain of “giving people money”, I think one should be more, not less, than averagely sensitive to the possibility that you are being deliberately misled. If someone shows all the signs that they are:
(1) omitting important information; “This car lacks brakes!” “Well, I would have told you but the email just didn’t have room for that information”
(2) interpreting data differently to how the modal reasonable person would without any explanation (and without providing the data upfront); [no patients in the hospital and only admin staff on payroll] “The hospital is operating at peak efficiency and achieving its strategic goals!”
(3) Equivocating or jumping from one claim to a different one without good reason; I honestly can’t think of a better example than the Hadza case for SMTM so I won’t try, and will just invite people to look at that again
then you should, in fact, model them as liars, and don’t give them your money. I think this is a reasonable heuristic, at least, but one is free to do whatever of course. I’d just put around a credence of 0.0000001 in you getting any sort of return on this investment. You might ask why one should not say “This person is radically wrong in this case, don’t give them money to study this” instead of accusing them of deliberate misrepresentation. Well, understanding when someone is lying is helpful to modelling future action. I think we would all mostly agree that it would be deeply unwise to “invest” in Bernie Madoff, or someone else who made their money convincing people to invest on the promise of good returns a la pyramid schemes. At least, the burden should be on them to demonstrate, with quite a high bar, that this time they are being entirely on the level with you.
Please don’t throw around accusations of “lying” because you had a different interpretation of some studies than they did. Even if they are objectively wrong about some, this could easily be errors, not malicious lies. (Not arguing about the object level here).
I do not merely have “a different interpretation of some studies” to SMTM- or at least, this is not centrally why I make the rather specific accusation I do (which I stand entirely by) (A few points of closer-to-object-level disagreement to follow, concluding with my “real” response here, if you want to skip ahead).
The first of three instances I cite here is closest to the pattern you describe, and even there, I wouldn’t suggest they were being purposefully misrepresentational if they had cited and disagreed with the paper in question. What we have instead is a paper clearly stating/providing, in its abstract and conclusion (and quite frankly, there is no other reasonable interpretation of the data they provide- one could dispute the data, but SMTM does not go this route) a causal story for secular weight gain (specifically during childhood), and SMTM using that citation narrowly to, in effect, make the contrary point (that this is a big old mystery, that our forebears ate more “bad” food than we did and mysteriously didn’t get fat). It gets worse, mind you, though I was trying to keep my initial comment (relatively) brief- since this is immediately followed up wth “we don’t seem to have any idea what that thing was”. I’m of the view that if SMTM had good reason to disagree with this and other papers they cite (to say nothing of the mass which address this question besides, but I’m not merely accusing them of being uninformed, as I said), then they should either explain why in individual cases, or give some reason for a blanket-dismissal of the literature (which they remain happy to cite for their own purposes, mind you, so the reason can’t be “utter incompetence of people in the field).
The second point simply leaps from a claim about percentages of intake to a claim about absolute intake with precisely no citation, explanation, or argument, in a way that clearly equivocates (I’ve had several conversations with people who have, in fact, “fallen for” this). SMTM are not fools, and they’re often praised for the quality of their writing, so I struggle to believe this was an innocent mistake. I won’t go over point 3, but I’ll make a more general point, a little further from the object level here too.
I think what can be an epistemic virtue in discussion can risk becoming a failure mode in action. Extending the sort of charity required to assume SMTM are merely misguided, or that a mere factual disagreement exists among us, despite evidence to the contrary, is a Good Thing, even if not strictly accurate, while we’re debating diet models, or considering the effects of lithium on body fat, or whatever else. We want to engage with the strongest possible version of our counterparts position, or at least engage on assumptions of good faith. That’s all great, and a positive thing in general about the LW/ACX/Rationalist community. On the other hand, if you’re trying to buy a car, or are contemplating a business deal, or (as here) are considering where to give money to charity, between “nets for african children”, “AI alignment”, ” When thinking in the domain of “giving people money”, I think one should be more, not less, than averagely sensitive to the possibility that you are being deliberately misled. If someone shows all the signs that they are:
(1) omitting important information; “This car lacks brakes!” “Well, I would have told you but the email just didn’t have room for that information”
(2) interpreting data differently to how the modal reasonable person would without any explanation (and without providing the data upfront); [no patients in the hospital and only admin staff on payroll] “The hospital is operating at peak efficiency and achieving its strategic goals!”
(3) Equivocating or jumping from one claim to a different one without good reason; I honestly can’t think of a better example than the Hadza case for SMTM so I won’t try, and will just invite people to look at that again
then you should, in fact, model them as liars, and don’t give them your money. I think this is a reasonable heuristic, at least, but one is free to do whatever of course. I’d just put around a credence of 0.0000001 in you getting any sort of return on this investment. You might ask why one should not say “This person is radically wrong in this case, don’t give them money to study this” instead of accusing them of deliberate misrepresentation. Well, understanding when someone is lying is helpful to modelling future action. I think we would all mostly agree that it would be deeply unwise to “invest” in Bernie Madoff, or someone else who made their money convincing people to invest on the promise of good returns a la pyramid schemes. At least, the burden should be on them to demonstrate, with quite a high bar, that this time they are being entirely on the level with you.