(But one thing I am fairly sure is not true is that LW-rationalists as such haven’t noticed, or that LW-rationality as such doesn’t acknowledge, such elementary observations as “effective reasoning involves working out how to solve problems and not just learning stereotyped ways to solve specific preordained problems” and “things happen in contexts and you should pay attention to those” and “when solving a problem, you should also consider whether you should actually be solving a different problem” and “sometimes the problems you’re presented with are not very clearly defined”, and to whatever extent “meta-rationality” is supposed to be distinguished from What We Do Around Here by recognizing this sort of thing I think there are straw men being erected.
I think the opposite. If the majority of LessWrongians were following meta-rules like “neat models don’t always apply to messy problems” or “you have to remember that every real computer and every real human is finite” or “mathematically true doesn’t imply real-world true”, then they would reject Aumann’s theorem AND Solomonoff induction AND Bayes as they are understood and promoted here. But clearly the majority don’t reject all three. (And they may well be applying meta-rationality correctly to areas that are less tribally totemic).
I think the opposite. If the majority of LessWrongians were following meta-rules like “neat models don’t always apply to messy problems” or “you have to remember that every real computer and every real human is finite” or “mathematically true doesn’t imply real-world true”, then they would reject Aumann’s theorem AND Solomonoff induction AND Bayes as they are understood and promoted here. But clearly the majority don’t reject all three. (And they may well be applying meta-rationality correctly to areas that are less tribally totemic).