My personal answer to these type of questions in general is that the naive conception of personhood/self/identity is incomplete and (probably because of our history of no cloning/teleportation) it is not suitable to use when thinking about these topics.
The problem is that it implicitly assumes that on the set of all observer-moments you can use the “same person” relation as an equivalence relation.
Instead I think when we will actually deal with these problems in practice should (and will fs) update our language with ways to express the branching nature of personal identity. The relation we want to capture is better modeled by the transitive closure of a directed tree composed with its converse.
So my answer to your question is that they don’t have enough information as “you” is ambiguous in this context.
My personal answer to these type of questions in general is that the naive conception of personhood/self/identity is incomplete and (probably because of our history of no cloning/teleportation) it is not suitable to use when thinking about these topics.
The problem is that it implicitly assumes that on the set of all observer-moments you can use the “same person” relation as an equivalence relation.
Instead I think when we will actually deal with these problems in practice should (and will fs) update our language with ways to express the branching nature of personal identity. The relation we want to capture is better modeled by the transitive closure of a directed tree composed with its converse.
So my answer to your question is that they don’t have enough information as “you” is ambiguous in this context.