Any poorer or more reliable country; so maybe Africa—but maybe the USA or Germany.
(And of course, we’ve all heard about Foxconn investing heavily in robotics, which is the sort of trend that might preserve some manufacturing-based GDP growth—at the price of increased economic inequality and through that trend, increase various low but catastrophic risks like war or revolution.)
In 1999 China was the 7th world economy by GDP, and had the highest GDP growth of the seven.
Making it the most likely to regress to the mean or fail to turn in continued exceptional performance. When you’re growing that fast, there’s not much your growth rate can do but go down at some point.
Pretty much every consumer product was already “made in China”. Was it so difficult to predict that China would have kept growing through the decade?
Any poorer or more reliable country; so maybe Africa—but maybe the USA or Germany.
The Chinese government seems highly reliable, and before Americans or German workers have lower salaries than Chinese workers, China would be the world’s largest economy.
(And of course, we’ve all heard about Foxconn investing heavily in robotics, which is the sort of trend that might preserve some manufacturing-based GDP growth—at the price of increased economic inequality and through that trend, increase various low but catastrophic risks like war or revolution.)
Just like industrial automation increased the risks of war and revolution in first world countries?
Making it the most likely to regress to the mean or fail to turn in continued exceptional performance. When you’re growing that fast, there’s not much your growth rate can do but go down at some point.
These trends usually don’t change abruptly. You can’t extrapolate them to 50 years, but 10 years seems reasonable. Moreover, as I answered to Vaniver, there were more fundamental reason for why China was expected to grow more than Japan or other first world countries.
It sure isn’t in hindsight.
Whatever. Pick your favorite Bayesian-Solomonoffian-Yudkowskyian-Muehlhauserian-ian method and make your best predicion about the size of the Chinese economy in 2009 using only data available up to 1999. Let’s see if your techniques pay rent.
Pick your favorite Bayesian-Solomonoffian-Yudkowskyian-Muehlhauserian-ian method and make your best predicion about the size of the Chinese economy in 2009 using only data available up to 1999. Let’s see if your techniques pay rent.
There is a certain temptation here, to pick and choose data that was available in 1999 that leads to a correct conclusion about 2009. This may be unintentional—the result of noting that the result is correct and then not bothering to double-check the sources, or of noting that the result is incorrect and then ruthlessly double-checking the sources and eliminating or updating some, or possibly altering some parts of the predictive model used, until such time as the result is correct.
I would therefore, personally, be more impressed about a correct prediction, made now, with regards to the size of the Chinese economy in 2023, than by a correct prediction, made now, with regards to the size of the Chinese economy in 2009, regardless of what information is used to make the prediction.
There is a certain temptation here, to pick and choose data that was available in 1999 that leads to a correct conclusion about 2009.
There’s far more than just a temptation. How do you even reconstruct the dataset one would’ve been working with in 1999? So many media sources or websites have disappeared or are completely inaccessible (enjoy 14 years of link rot), or the print versions are extremely time-consuming to access (public libraries keep only a few years of periodicals). In addition, people who turned out wrong about China will not be mentioning, citing, or linking their old 1999 pieces or projections even though they were drawing on plenty of germane information, so there’s a double whammy of both references disappearing and knowledge of the disappeared materials itself disappearing.
One could pick a publication which has survived to the present and invested heavily in making its materials accessible, like the Economist, but what would such an exercise boot you? ‘A hypothetical person like the 2013 me, inextricably contaminated by more than a decade of knowledge & experience, who read only everything mentioning “China” in the Economist up to 1999 and not any critics or dissenters or commentary, would estimate X% for China growing such-and-such.’ Well, uh, ok...
Surely you’re kidding? This is the same Chinese government that went through an internal power struggle over Bao during the just past decadal transfer of power, which is almost as opaque as North Korea, and which just yesterday was revealed to have hacked the NYT’s entire internal network as retaliation for reporting on the premier’s relatives accumulating billions in suspiciously-obtained wealth and to obtain the names of anyone who helped the NYT investigation? This is the image of a reliable government?
These trends usually don’t change abruptly.
How abruptly did the Japanese trend change? Feel free to look it up.
Pick your favorite Bayesian-Solomonoffian-Yudkowskyian-Muehlhauserian-ian method and make your best predicion about the size of the Chinese economy in 2009 using only data available up to 1999.
You want someone who is pointing out hindsight bias to go and engage in a worthless exercise one knows in advance will be contaminated by hindsight bias? I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make here.
GDP grew linearly from 1990 to 1995, then it oscillated approximately around the 1993 value. It seems the typical pattern that one would expect when you converge to a steady state economy. It may have started to grow again in 2009, or maybe that’s just another oscillation.
Convergence to an approximate steady state is what I’d expect in a “full”, technologically advanced country.
You want someone who is pointing out hindsight bias to go and engage in a worthless exercise one knows in advance will be contaminated by hindsight bias? I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make here.
So you are saying that Kurzweil prediction was not obvious. Which means that it was surprising. So, what did the unsurprising scenario look like? You refuse to answer.
Whether you will be hacked and your trade secrets leaked to a competitor is not irrelevant. Whether you’ll be forced to bribe officials to do business is not irrelevant. Whether you can count on them to stay bribed and not be imprisoned is not irrelevant. Whether you have to worry, ala Rio Tinto, that your executives will be imprisoned is not irrelevant. Whether the succession of power will be smooth and not descend into coups or other infighting is not irrelevant. Politics matters; a company might not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in the company.
GDP grew linearly from 1990 to 1995, then it oscillated approximately around the 1993 value. It seems the typical pattern that one would expect when you converge to a steady state economy. It may have started to grow again in 2009, or maybe that’s just another oscillation.
And if you look at the growth rate, you see that not only was the growth rate leading to exponential growth (4% a year compounding), the growth rate itself grew to 7.15%, after which it fell a percentage point or two a year until in 1998 it was actually negative 2%, whereupon it hovers around 0% with occasional small periods of growth counterbalanced by disasters like negative 5.5% in 2009 (‘may have started to grow again’?).
A flat real GDP contradicts your previous claims that a stable economy should then grow at the rate of technological improvements; or has there been no such improvements since 1989?
The GDP at Purchase Power Parity curve is much less wavy
So, what did the unsurprising scenario look like? You refuse to answer.
Refused? I already answered: it looks like the middle-income trap which has affected many countries. The country just stops growing significantly, or actually declines in real terms, due to any of the potential problems already listed.
Whether you will be hacked and your trade secrets leaked to a competitor is not irrelevant. Whether you’ll be forced to bribe officials to do business is not irrelevant. Whether you can count on them to stay bribed and not be imprisoned is not irrelevant. Whether you have to worry, ala Rio Tinto, that your executives will be imprisoned is not irrelevant.
China is known to have a fairly predictable patterns for bribery. Predictable bribey becomes de facto just another tax. Of course there can be occasional exceptions.
Whether the succession of power will be smooth and not descend into coups or other infighting is not irrelevant.
The last one was the Chinese Revolution in 1949.
And if you look at the growth rate, you see that not only was the growth rate leading to exponential growth (4% a year compounding), the growth rate itself grew to 7.15%, after which it fell a percentage point or two a year until in 1998 it was actually negative 2%, whereupon it hovers around 0% with occasional small periods of growth counterbalanced by disasters like negative 5.5% in 2009 (‘may have started to grow again’?).
Derivatives magnify noise. Compute a 5 years average.
A flat real GDP contradicts your previous claims that a stable economy should then grow at the rate of technological improvements; or has there been no such improvements since 1989?
Japan current GDP, both nominal and PPP, are higher today than in 1989.
Refused? I already answered: it looks like the middle-income trap which has affected many countries. The country just stops growing significantly, or actually declines in real terms, due to any of the potential problems already listed.
The middle-income trap that didn’t happen in Japan, or South Korea, or many other countries.
China is known to have a fairly predictable patterns for bribery. Predictable bribey becomes de facto just another tax. Of course there can be occasional exceptions.
Handwaving away just one of the examples.
The last one was the Chinese Revolution in 1949.
Yes, minus some minor events like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Russia & China nearly going to nuclear war in 1969, Tienanmen Square… Gosh, there’s no reason to think that China is at the slightest risk of war or revolution; it’d be like worrying about nuclear warfare when the last nuclear bomb used in a war was back in 1946!
Derivatives magnify noise. Compute a 5 years average.
Better yet, let’s look at 1989-2011 using the FRED data on real GDP. Over 23 years, the economy increased in size by 26%, for an annualized growth rate of ~1%. This in a time period which saw, among other things, the Internet revolution start and reach maturity. Did technology really improve only by 1% Is this really consistent with your claim that Japan hit the limits of what is possible?
Japan current GDP, both nominal and PPP, are higher today than in 1989.
Use real figures. Inflation has not been 0% the entire period, and your chosen graphs aren’t even being reported in yen.
The middle-income trap that didn’t happen in Japan, or South Korea, or many other countries.
‘Many’? Look at a ranking of real PPP, there’s a great many countries well below South Korea. Above SK, it’s basically oil countries, European/American countries, and tiny outliers like Singapore.
Any poorer or more reliable country; so maybe Africa—but maybe the USA or Germany.
(And of course, we’ve all heard about Foxconn investing heavily in robotics, which is the sort of trend that might preserve some manufacturing-based GDP growth—at the price of increased economic inequality and through that trend, increase various low but catastrophic risks like war or revolution.)
Making it the most likely to regress to the mean or fail to turn in continued exceptional performance. When you’re growing that fast, there’s not much your growth rate can do but go down at some point.
It sure isn’t in hindsight.
The Chinese government seems highly reliable, and before Americans or German workers have lower salaries than Chinese workers, China would be the world’s largest economy.
Just like industrial automation increased the risks of war and revolution in first world countries?
These trends usually don’t change abruptly. You can’t extrapolate them to 50 years, but 10 years seems reasonable. Moreover, as I answered to Vaniver, there were more fundamental reason for why China was expected to grow more than Japan or other first world countries.
Whatever.
Pick your favorite Bayesian-Solomonoffian-Yudkowskyian-Muehlhauserian-ian method and make your best predicion about the size of the Chinese economy in 2009 using only data available up to 1999. Let’s see if your techniques pay rent.
There is a certain temptation here, to pick and choose data that was available in 1999 that leads to a correct conclusion about 2009. This may be unintentional—the result of noting that the result is correct and then not bothering to double-check the sources, or of noting that the result is incorrect and then ruthlessly double-checking the sources and eliminating or updating some, or possibly altering some parts of the predictive model used, until such time as the result is correct.
I would therefore, personally, be more impressed about a correct prediction, made now, with regards to the size of the Chinese economy in 2023, than by a correct prediction, made now, with regards to the size of the Chinese economy in 2009, regardless of what information is used to make the prediction.
There’s far more than just a temptation. How do you even reconstruct the dataset one would’ve been working with in 1999? So many media sources or websites have disappeared or are completely inaccessible (enjoy 14 years of link rot), or the print versions are extremely time-consuming to access (public libraries keep only a few years of periodicals). In addition, people who turned out wrong about China will not be mentioning, citing, or linking their old 1999 pieces or projections even though they were drawing on plenty of germane information, so there’s a double whammy of both references disappearing and knowledge of the disappeared materials itself disappearing.
One could pick a publication which has survived to the present and invested heavily in making its materials accessible, like the Economist, but what would such an exercise boot you? ‘A hypothetical person like the 2013 me, inextricably contaminated by more than a decade of knowledge & experience, who read only everything mentioning “China” in the Economist up to 1999 and not any critics or dissenters or commentary, would estimate X% for China growing such-and-such.’ Well, uh, ok...
Surely you’re kidding? This is the same Chinese government that went through an internal power struggle over Bao during the just past decadal transfer of power, which is almost as opaque as North Korea, and which just yesterday was revealed to have hacked the NYT’s entire internal network as retaliation for reporting on the premier’s relatives accumulating billions in suspiciously-obtained wealth and to obtain the names of anyone who helped the NYT investigation? This is the image of a reliable government?
How abruptly did the Japanese trend change? Feel free to look it up.
You want someone who is pointing out hindsight bias to go and engage in a worthless exercise one knows in advance will be contaminated by hindsight bias? I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make here.
That’s irrelevant from a business point of view.
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=k3s92bru78li6_&ctype=l&met_y=pppgdp#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ngdpd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=world&idim=country:JP&ifdim=world&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false
GDP grew linearly from 1990 to 1995, then it oscillated approximately around the 1993 value. It seems the typical pattern that one would expect when you converge to a steady state economy. It may have started to grow again in 2009, or maybe that’s just another oscillation.
The GDP at Purchase Power Parity curve is much less wavy: http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=k3s92bru78li6_&ctype=l&met_y=pppgdp#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=pppgdp&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=world&idim=country:JP&ifdim=world&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false
Convergence to an approximate steady state is what I’d expect in a “full”, technologically advanced country.
So you are saying that Kurzweil prediction was not obvious. Which means that it was surprising. So, what did the unsurprising scenario look like? You refuse to answer.
Whether you will be hacked and your trade secrets leaked to a competitor is not irrelevant. Whether you’ll be forced to bribe officials to do business is not irrelevant. Whether you can count on them to stay bribed and not be imprisoned is not irrelevant. Whether you have to worry, ala Rio Tinto, that your executives will be imprisoned is not irrelevant. Whether the succession of power will be smooth and not descend into coups or other infighting is not irrelevant. Politics matters; a company might not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in the company.
And if you look at the growth rate, you see that not only was the growth rate leading to exponential growth (4% a year compounding), the growth rate itself grew to 7.15%, after which it fell a percentage point or two a year until in 1998 it was actually negative 2%, whereupon it hovers around 0% with occasional small periods of growth counterbalanced by disasters like negative 5.5% in 2009 (‘may have started to grow again’?).
A flat real GDP contradicts your previous claims that a stable economy should then grow at the rate of technological improvements; or has there been no such improvements since 1989?
It’s also misleading since it’s not real GDP PPP. If you look at a graph of real GDP like http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/JPNRGDPR or real GDP PPP http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/JPNRGDPC , you see the abrupt break at 1989; if the ’80s trend had continued, the real GDP would be off the chart.
Refused? I already answered: it looks like the middle-income trap which has affected many countries. The country just stops growing significantly, or actually declines in real terms, due to any of the potential problems already listed.
China is known to have a fairly predictable patterns for bribery. Predictable bribey becomes de facto just another tax. Of course there can be occasional exceptions.
The last one was the Chinese Revolution in 1949.
Derivatives magnify noise. Compute a 5 years average.
Japan current GDP, both nominal and PPP, are higher today than in 1989.
The middle-income trap that didn’t happen in Japan, or South Korea, or many other countries.
Handwaving away just one of the examples.
Yes, minus some minor events like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Russia & China nearly going to nuclear war in 1969, Tienanmen Square… Gosh, there’s no reason to think that China is at the slightest risk of war or revolution; it’d be like worrying about nuclear warfare when the last nuclear bomb used in a war was back in 1946!
Better yet, let’s look at 1989-2011 using the FRED data on real GDP. Over 23 years, the economy increased in size by 26%, for an annualized growth rate of ~1%. This in a time period which saw, among other things, the Internet revolution start and reach maturity. Did technology really improve only by 1% Is this really consistent with your claim that Japan hit the limits of what is possible?
Use real figures. Inflation has not been 0% the entire period, and your chosen graphs aren’t even being reported in yen.
‘Many’? Look at a ranking of real PPP, there’s a great many countries well below South Korea. Above SK, it’s basically oil countries, European/American countries, and tiny outliers like Singapore.
Biting sarcasm rarely improves one’s point, though it’s a great way to signal.
Biting sarcasm rarely improves one’s point, though it’s a great way to signal.