This isn’t your clearest essay, and I’m not completely sure of the point you’re making, but I think you make quite a leap at the end. It seems like you want to equate my awareness of changes to myself with my identity; so any change that’s imperceptible to my awareness of myself would not change my identity. This seems odd. For one thing, if you tell me you’re going to change my neurons to robotic equivalents (or if I study the procedure), aren’t I then aware of the change? I think you’d have a hard time defining consciousness as something I could detect a change in.
This isn’t your clearest essay, and I’m not completely sure of the point you’re making, but I think you make quite a leap at the end. It seems like you want to equate my awareness of changes to myself with my identity; so any change that’s imperceptible to my awareness of myself would not change my identity. This seems odd. For one thing, if you tell me you’re going to change my neurons to robotic equivalents (or if I study the procedure), aren’t I then aware of the change? I think you’d have a hard time defining consciousness as something I could detect a change in.