“Has it ceased to be true that, in such-and-such a proportion of Everett branches or Tegmark duplicates in which box B has a blue stamp, box B contains a diamond?”
I am baffled as to why a person who calls himself a Bayesian continually resorts to such frequentist thinking. And in this case, it’s spectacularly inappropriate frequentist reasoning. Unless someone used a Geiger counter to decide whether or not to put a diamond in the box, quantum-level uncertainty is utterly irrelevant to this problem.
“Has it ceased to be true that, in such-and-such a proportion of Everett branches or Tegmark duplicates in which box B has a blue stamp, box B contains a diamond?”
I am baffled as to why a person who calls himself a Bayesian continually resorts to such frequentist thinking. And in this case, it’s spectacularly inappropriate frequentist reasoning. Unless someone used a Geiger counter to decide whether or not to put a diamond in the box, quantum-level uncertainty is utterly irrelevant to this problem.