One description of an archetypal money-pumping situation (where an agent prefers A to B, and B to A, and keeps swapping one for the other with another agent, to whom he pays commission) is that the first agent derives utility from the act of obtaining either A or B in exchange for its counterpart, and he’s paying for that service.
If utilitarianism is to make sense as a model, you can’t question someone’s utility. If money-pumping is to be a meaningful description of a possible scenario, it has to be structural, not just a narrative that can be ascribed to an agent’s preferences.
I don’t think what I’ve written applies to arbitrary money-pumping. An agent with incoherent preferences doesn’t have a utility function.
RichardKennaway models a habitual gambler as having incoherent preferences because the gambler prefers money to not having money but prefers taking negative-EV (in terms of money) bets to taking no bets. I model a habitual gambler as having a utility function which includes a term for money but which includes a second term for, I dunno, “excitement,” and a negative-EV (in terms of money) bet has positive expected utility for such a gambler because of the gain in excitement. I think this is a more accurate model, and I also don’t think habitual gambling is in isolation evidence of incoherent preferences. (I’m not claiming that humans have coherent preferences, though.)
RichardKennaway models a habitual gambler as having incoherent preferences because the gambler prefers money to not having money but prefers taking negative-EV (in terms of money) bets to taking no bets. I model a habitual gambler as having a utility function which includes a term for money but which includes a second term for, I dunno, “excitement,” and a negative-EV (in terms of money) bet has positive expected utility for such a gambler because of the gain in excitement. I think this is a more accurate model, and I also don’t think habitual gambling is in isolation evidence of incoherent preferences. (I’m not claiming that humans have coherent preferences, though.)
Yes. I’m bothered when people criticize gambling on the ground that it’s negative EV in terms of money, given that (say) going to the cinema is also negative EV in terms of money but few people criticize that on that ground. (I guess that what’s going on is that those people enjoy going to the cinema but don’t enjoy gambling, and don’t realize other people may be different.)
One description of an archetypal money-pumping situation (where an agent prefers A to B, and B to A, and keeps swapping one for the other with another agent, to whom he pays commission) is that the first agent derives utility from the act of obtaining either A or B in exchange for its counterpart, and he’s paying for that service.
If utilitarianism is to make sense as a model, you can’t question someone’s utility. If money-pumping is to be a meaningful description of a possible scenario, it has to be structural, not just a narrative that can be ascribed to an agent’s preferences.
I don’t think what I’ve written applies to arbitrary money-pumping. An agent with incoherent preferences doesn’t have a utility function.
RichardKennaway models a habitual gambler as having incoherent preferences because the gambler prefers money to not having money but prefers taking negative-EV (in terms of money) bets to taking no bets. I model a habitual gambler as having a utility function which includes a term for money but which includes a second term for, I dunno, “excitement,” and a negative-EV (in terms of money) bet has positive expected utility for such a gambler because of the gain in excitement. I think this is a more accurate model, and I also don’t think habitual gambling is in isolation evidence of incoherent preferences. (I’m not claiming that humans have coherent preferences, though.)
Yes. I’m bothered when people criticize gambling on the ground that it’s negative EV in terms of money, given that (say) going to the cinema is also negative EV in terms of money but few people criticize that on that ground. (I guess that what’s going on is that those people enjoy going to the cinema but don’t enjoy gambling, and don’t realize other people may be different.)